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Abstract 
Recently, observation of pain has been linked to areas of the brain coding the 
sensory/discriminative aspects of pain (Avenanti et al., 2005; Avenanti et al., 2006). The 
experiential qualities associated with observing another in pain are poorly understood. In 
this thesis, we demonstrate that pain generated by observation of others in pain is reported 
by a significant minority of healthy individuals. The pain reported is mild, transient and 
occurs in the same location as the observed pain. Ten pain responders were matched with 
ten non-responders to take part in an fMRI study observing others in pain. Responders 
activated emotional and sensory brain regions associated with pain while the non-
responders activated very little. Reports of pain were more likely to be accompanied by a 
pain memory. Pain responders are quicker to represent the perspective of others and have a 
more flexible sense of body ownership but are not more likely to report somatic symptoms 
during incongruent sensori-motor feedback. These findings provide convincing evidence 
that some people can readily experience pain during observation of others‘ pain. It is 
plausible that the mechanism underpinning pain reports evoked by observation of pain is 
not specific to pain processing per se. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The most commonly accepted definition of pain is provided by the International 
Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) (described by Merskey, 1991). The IASP 
definition states that pain is ―an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated 
with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage… Pain is 
always subjective.‖ 
 The above definition of pain outlines that pain is subjective and is associated with 
actual or potential tissue damage. Most theories take account of the physiological changes 
linked to tissue damage, accounting for ―pain is always subjective‖. Subjectivity of 
experience has always presented a problem for theories of pain. Subjectivity of experience 
refers to the way individuals perceive stimuli and events. For example, some people report 
a painful stimulus as intolerable and others as mildly unpleasant. Inter individual 
variability of pain has been associated with different patterns of brain activity. Coghill, 
McHaffie and Yen (2003) demonstrated that participants who reported more pain in 
response to noxious stimuli showed greater activity in the areas of the brain linked to the 
unpleasant aspects of pain.  The subjectivity or psychological experience of pain is often 
used as a vague explanation for pain without accompanying pathology. Often in the 
absence of pathology, pain is referred to a psychogenic, psychosomatic, or just ―all in the 
head‖. Psychosomatic accounts of pain focus on the role of psychological factors that 
prolong and exacerbate acute pain caused by noxious input and fail to offer a mechanism 
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that accounts for pain entirely in the absence of injury.  Perceiving painful stimuli is 
somewhat dependent on patterns of learning, mainly through interaction with others.  
Previous exposure to painful events likely shapes the way we respond to future painful 
events and pain in others. Representations of pain are activated during observation of 
others in pain (Singer et al., 2004; Jackson, Meltzoff and Decety, 2005). It is plausible that 
different representations of pain experienced by the self can inform and vary the way we 
experience pain in others. Observation of pain is a new and emerging literature that may 
offer insight into pain generated in the absence of injury, namely pain generated through 
observation of others in pain.  
1.2 Models of Pain   
1.2.1 Specificity Theory  
 
 Here we discuss past and present conceptual models of pain and how they explain 
pain generated in the absence of injury. The first model is commonly known as the 
specificity theory. This idea of pain as a physical expression of injury was first proposed 
by Rene Descartes (1664). He proposed that pain is a physical sensation, associated with 
bodily injury, to provide protection against further injury (Melzack, 2001).  Descartes 
described pain as a warning system involving ‗threads‘ that are set in motion by 
threatening stimuli such as a fire. These threads run through the body to a specialized pain 
centre in the brain. Descartes suggested pain as analogous to pulling a rope to ring a church 
bell. Consequently, he proposed a one-to-one relationship between injury and 
psychological experience (e.g. pinpricks may evoke a sharp intense sensation; bruises 
evoke a dull, gnawing experience and so on). Although a one-to-one relationship between 
stimulus and pain is hard to account for, in general specificity theory has some purchase, 
but there is a surprising degree of variability in the intensity of the experience from a given 
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Figure 1.1: L = large diameter fibers; S = small 
diameter fibers; SG = substantia gelatinosa; T = 
first central transmission cells; + = excitation; - = 
inhibition. Melzack and Wall’s gate control theory 
of pain. 
noxious stimulus. The stimulus that creates the pain, e.g. a needle, is obviously identical in 
all cases but the pain experience associated with the stimulus is highly variable between 
individuals. For example Melzack, Wall & Tye, (1982) recorded reports of pain during 
emergency room admissions and found that 40 percent of patients reported no pain, despite 
extensive physical injuries.  The absence of pain in the presence of extensive physical 
injury is difficult to reconcile with the specificity theory of pain. An extensive injury 
should evoke a proportionate amount of pain. In at least some cases, however, pain is not 
tightly linked to the objective external stimulus (e.g. a needle).    
 Specificity theory fails to take account of the subjective nature of pain. When pain 
experience no longer accurately reflects the stimulus or external noxious event then other 
factors might be considered to be 
important. This creates a number 
of problems, one of which is the 
lack of ability to account for the 
variability in pain experience 
normally called psychosomatic 
pain. Psychosomatic pain is said to 
generate from psychological or 
emotional factors such as stress. 
Many theorists believe that if there 
is no objective evidence of pathology then pain does not exist. For example, Valerie 
Hardcastle (1997) purports that pain is best understood in terms of a biological system and 
that psychosomatic pain (pain of psychological origin) does not exist. She argues that it is 
the lack of understanding of the physiology of pain that prevents us from understanding 
pain experience.  
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According to specificity theory, injury causes pain by activating specialized pain 
fibres that relay information to a specialized pain centre in the brain. Prior to the gate 
control theory it was widely believed that the small diameter Aδ and C fibres, which 
preferentially process noxious stimuli, transmitted noxious information directly to the brain 
without modification.  
Melzack and Wall (1965), however, demonstrated that the large sensory fibres, 
which process non-noxious tactile stimuli, can inhibit noxious information. This is why 
rubbing an injured area can be soothing. The inhibition was proposed to take place via the 
substantia gelatinosa (SG) which receives input from the large and small sensory fibres. 
Large fibres activate the SG, which inhibits transmission cells (closing the gate), whereas 
small fibres inhibit the SG allowing the transmission cells to fire (opening the gate). The 
gate control theory (GCT) also included a descending influence from the brain that could 
close the gate. GCT was the first theory to include central processing in a model of pain 
processing. Consequently, Melzack and Wall provided a theory that could explain the 
variation in pain due to psychological factors. GCT emphasizes a variable relationship 
between noxious input and pain experience, while still allowing pain to follow peripheral 
noxious input. GCT focuses upon the role of external noxious input but also emphasizes 
the role of a central or psychological mechanism through which pain is experienced. As a 
result the GCT does not account for pain experience evoked entirely in the absence of any 
noxious peripheral input e.g. in cases of chronic lower back pain.  It also fails to explicitly 
outline the role of psychological factors and how they contribute to variability in pain 
experience.   In addition the role of central processing, as described by the theory, is not 
clearly explained.  The extent and importance of central processing, and how pain is coded 
in the brain, are both vaguely explained.  
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1.3 Brain regions implicated in affect and sensory aspects pain  
 An attempt to resolve the vague notion of brain involvement in pain was the 
neuromatrix proposed by Melzack (1990). Recent advances in neuroimaging techniques 
such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) have made it possible to study the brain during experiences of pain.  It has been 
demonstrated that pain experience is coded in terms of sensory/discriminative and 
affective/motivational components. These two components have distinct corresponding 
brain regions. A popular term for the areas of the brain associated with pain experience is 
the pain neuromatrix. The sensory discriminative areas are subserved by the primary and 
secondary somatosensory cortices as well as the posterior insula. The affective motivation 
qualities of pain are coded primarily by the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the 
anterior insula (AI). Distinct networks representing emotional and sensory aspects of pain 
highlight the involvement of sensory and emotional factors in pain perception.  Patients 
with brain lesions that impair the connection between somato-sensory and emotional areas 
can detect noxious stimuli but display no signs of unpleasantness. Although the patients 
were able to detect the noxious stimulus, they exhibited little or no signs of discomfort or 
unpleasantness. The patients report that ―the pain is still there, but it doesn‘t bother me‖ (p 
52, Grahek, 2001). It is believed that in the case of patients with pain asymbolia, the 
absence of connection between the somato-sensory areas and emotional areas reduces the 
pain experience.  Pain without unpleasantness ceases to have both the sensory and 
emotional components of pain and no longer feels like it hurts or is painful. 
 It is also the case that experiencing the unpleasantness of pain without the 
accompanying physical sensations is also unlikely to constitute a complete experience of 
pain. People may explain a subjective experience couched in terms of pain and hurt which 
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are subserved by the same brain regions as physical pain (Eisenberg, Lieberman and 
Williams, 2003). In the absence of pain sensation there is merely unpleasant experience. 
Unpleasant experience without accompanying physical sensation is no longer a sensory 
experience. Pain without localized sensation is no longer a pain because the hallmark of 
pain is physical sensation.  
 It is unlikely that there is one to one experience of pain and neural output from 
brain activity created by a single stimulus.  However, the pain matrix illustrates the very 
tight relationship between pain sensation and pain affect. Despite illustrating that pain 
experience is a mixture of sensation and emotion, the pain neuromatrix is only a 
description of brain areas associated with pain experience and does not offer a theory of 
pain processing or subjective pain experience. The problem of pain is highlighted by 
functional pain disorders.  
1.4 Functional Pain  
1.4.1 Prevalence of functional pain 
 
Pain without an identifiable cause is typically referred to as ‗functional pain‘ 
(Deyo, Battie, Beurksens, Bombardier, Croft et al., 1998) and encompasses other terms 
such as psychogenic, psychosomatic or medically unexplained symptoms. The term 
functional was introduced to escape some of the negative associations that imply pain of a 
psychological origin.  Persistent intractable pain that develops in the absence of injury is 
predominantly classified as a psychological disorder, classified by DSM IV as function 
disorders (Bass, Peveler and House, 2001; Mayou et al., 1995). Despite the lack of 
objective physiological markers or injury, many patients report debilitating levels of pain 
experience (Arnold, Clifford, Mease, Burgess & Palmer et al., 2008).  Prevalence for these 
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disorders ranges from 0.5% to 5% in developed countries (Angst, Brioschi, Main, 
Lehmann et al., 2006). Diagnosis is predominantly based on self report of pain persisting 
for 12 weeks or more without an identifiable biomedical cause (Schweinhart, Sauro & 
Bushnell, 2008).  
1.4.2 The problem of functional pain  
 
The severity of impairment in functional disorders can vary, with some patients 
becoming wheelchair bound (Bass and Murphy, 1991), and others having to leave 
employment (Henriksson and Burckhardt, 1996) or make other adjustments to their 
lifestyle e.g. restrict physical activity, (Soderberg and Lundman, 2001).  Smith et al. (1986) 
reported that on average patients with somatic functional disorder spent seven days in bed 
every month.   Diagnosis for functional pain disorders is problematic because pain is 
usually associated with an organic or physical marker and tightly linked to specific signs 
and symptoms. For example Rheumatoid arthritis (RA) is a disease characterized by pain, 
stiffness, inflammation of the joints and fatigue and is diagnosed based on objectively 
measured physiological characteristics, including an increase in rheumatoid factor (an 
antibody directed towards the organisms own cells) (Carson, Chen, Fox, Kipps, et al., 
1987) and anti CPP (anti-cyclic citrullinated peptide antibody) (Kuhn, Khulik and 
Tumooka, 2006). Unlike the diagnosis of RA, functional pain, e.g. fibromyalgia and 
chronic lower back pain, are diagnosed without evidence of organic pathology. Diagnosis 
in both conditions is mainly based on self reported symptoms and/or tender point/mobility 
tests (Waddell, Feder, McIntosh, Lewis et al., 1996; Wolf, Smythe and Yunus, 1990).  The 
problem associated with diagnosing a condition that has no physical marker is that the 
conditions are subjective and thus difficult or impossible to successfully treat. For 
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Figure 1.2 A model of factors involved in the 
generation of functional somatic syndromes, 
reproduced from Mayou, Bass and Sharpe (1995).  
example, fatigue, muscle pain, reduced mobility and a lack of energy are all general 
symptoms common to other diseases or psychological problems.   
1.4.3 Functional pain and mental health  
  
 Functional pain disorders are usually discussed as psychological problems because 
of the absence of organic pathology as well as concomitant mental disorders such as 
anxiety, depression, hypochondriasis and helplessness (Bayer, Baer And Early, 1991). 
Psychological factors are believed to prolong acute pain so that the pain becomes a long 
term chronic problem, after the 
original injury has healed (Da 
Costa, Dobkin, Fitzcharles, Fortin, 
et al., 2000; Linton, Buer, 
Vlaeyen, & Hellising 2000).  
Anxiety has been demonstrated to 
increase pain severity and pain 
behaviour in chronic pain patients 
(Kain et al., 2000) and also in 
healthy controls (Rhudy and 
Meager, 2000).  While 
concomitant psychological problems are common in functional pain syndromes, it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent to which psychological factors play a part in the aetiology 
of chronic pain disorders. There have been few studies investigating the relationship 
between depression and fibromyalgia but none that have examined the causal relationship 
between the two (Fassbender et al., 1997).  It is difficult to understand if patients with 
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functional pain have psychological disorders such as depression because of their pain, or 
whether the psychological problems themselves are more central to the generation of pain. 
1.5 Bridging the gap between psychological and physical pain 
One theory which attempts to explain the more subjective nature of functional pain   
and the psychological influence upon pain sensation is the biopsychosocial model (BPS). 
The model was first applied to chronic pain by Waddel in 1987. The theory proposes that 
chronic pain is a product of a complex interaction of biological, cognitive, emotional and 
social factors.  The interaction of the psychological and biological factors offers a plausible 
heuristic for understanding the subjective pain experience (Renn & Dorsey, 2005). 
Although BPS offers a plausible heuristic for the chronic nature of pain, the theory does 
not elaborate on the interplay between psychology, biology and social influences. The 
biopsychosocial model attempts to bridge the gap between the mind and the body but does 
not explain how physical components such as pain, fatigue and tension are driven by 
psychological factors (Butler, Evans, Greaves and Simpson, 2004).  Despite the acceptance 
that psychological factors play a part in pain perception, the onset of pain is still considered 
by medicine as largely as a product of physical injury or disease (Mayou, Kirmayer, 
Simon, Kroenke and Sharpe, 2005). In figure 1.2 the reliance on physiological mechanisms 
for generating pain, even within a biopsychosocial model, is illustrated. The model 
proposes that somatic sensations are interpreted as symptoms of illness and are perpetuated 
by psychological factors such as anxiety and depression. The putative assumption that 
symptoms are a product of a disease or physical problem is not, however, fully supported 
(Mayou et al., 2005). Ruo, Rumsfeld, Hlatky, Lui et al. (2003) demonstrated that symptom 
burden, physical limitation and overall health are not linked to actual disease severity in 
heart disease patients (i.e. ischemia) but were linked with depression.  It is perhaps 
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unsurprising that patients who reported higher depressive symptoms were less likely to 
perform exercise and had poorer general health status. This research highlights the flexible 
relationship between physical symptoms and disease.  The biopsychosocial model does not 
account for the generation of pain in the absence of injury. Recently new innovative 
methods have been adopted to investigate pain without injury.  
1.6 Generating pain sensation without external noxious stimuli 
1.6.1 Sensori—motor conflict 
 
 Pain experience in the absence of noxious stimuli has been demonstrated by 
McCabe, Haigh, Ring, Halligan, Wall and Blake (2003), the mechanism for which is 
described in terms of sensory-motor conflict. For example a sensory-motor conflict can 
arise when an intended action is matched to the intention, intending to kick a ball results in 
kicking the ball, and the sensory experience associated with the action is reduced. In 
contrast, when an intended action is not matched to the intention, intending to kick a ball 
results in kicking the ground, and the sensory experience associated with the action is 
increased. The sensorimotor system receives sensory feedback that the intended and 
perceived action are incompatible (Jeannerod, 1997).  Our internal state is constantly being 
monitored and checked against real and self generated movement and action. It is thought 
that tickling provides a useful case study for this comparative system.  
 It is well established that we are not able to tickle ourselves; one of the reasons put 
forward to explain this phenomenon is sensory motor feedback. When we tickle ourselves, 
we intend to tickle ourselves, and the match between the intended outcome and perceived 
outcome dampen downs the tickle sensation as we are able to predict each movement. 
When we are tickled, the intended movement and the perceived movement are not 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
12 
 
 
Figure 1.3: The role of the efference copy on the motor control system. A motor (efferent) 
command produces an efferent copy which contains predictions about the outcome of 
movement. The predicted sensory outcome is then compared (using visual feedback) with the 
actual sensory feedback. When the predicted outcome and the actual outcome are matched 
then there are no sensory disturbances. When predicted and actual outcomes are 
mismatched then there is an increased sensory disturbance resulting in transient somatic 
sensations such as pain, discomfort, temperature changes and weight changes.  
 
compatible because we cannot predict the intended movements of others. The mismatch 
between the intended and perceived action in this case results in uncomfortable tickle 
sensations (see figure 1.3).  
 McCabe, Haigh, Ring, Halligan, Wall and Blake (2003) hypothesized that a 
mismatch between visual information and motor commands could explain the functional 
syndrome chronic widespread pain syndrome (CWPS).  McCabe et al. (2003) recruited 
patients who had CWPS for varying amounts of time from 3 weeks to 3 years, and who all 
reported pain in a single limb.  Patients were seated and a mirror board was placed to hide 
the affected limb.  Patients observed their healthy limb and the reflection of their healthy 
limb in the mirror.  They were then asked to produce flexion and extension type 
movements while focusing on the reflection of their healthy limb.  Participants were 
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Figure 1.4: The procedure used in McCabe et al (2005). a) On 
the left is a participant carrying out congruent movement and, b) 
on the right, the same participant carrying out incongruent 
feedback. 
instructed to practice these movements for six weeks following the initial session. At six 
weeks, participants who were in the early stages of CWPS (less than eight weeks) reported 
a significant reduction in pain compared to the initial session.  Patients who had 
experienced CWPS for longer than two years, however, failed to report a reduction in pain. 
The pain reduction suggests that a mismatch between the sensory-motor information could 
account for pain experienced in early CWPS.  The absence of any improvements in 
patients who have experienced CWPS for over two years could reflect permanent changes 
to neural pathways occurring from prolonged pain experience (McCabe et al., 2003)   
 Using the same paradigm, McCabe, Haigh, Halligan and Blake (2005) suggested 
that painful sensation might occur as a result of mismatches between efferent sensory-
motor commands and visual input in healthy subjects free from pain.   Participants placed 
their arms either side of a mirror board with one arm hidden out of view (see figure 1.4a). 
They were then asked to move their arms up and down in synchrony (see figure 1.4a) or 
asynchrony (see fig 1.4b) whilst keeping their attention on the mirror feedback. When the 
movement was 
synchronous, the visual 
feedback was congruent 
(i.e. the participant‘s 
movement of the arm 
matched the visual input 
from the mirror 
feedback).  
 After completing 
the conditions, 
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participants reported that they felt a range of sensations in the occluded arm when moving 
asynchronously. These sensations included weight and temperature changes as well as mild 
pain and discomfort described as tingly, pins and needles, shooting or achy. This 
generation of pain in healthy volunteers demonstrates that pain and other anomalous 
sensory changes can be generated without peripheral input. McCabe et al. (2005) propose 
that central processes, presumably in the motor system, related to the mismatch between 
the predicted and observed movement, generate the reported sensations.  
 Around 15% of the sample experienced pain and around 60% of the sample 
reported at least one somatic change such as the hand getting heavier, colder, hotter, 
feeling of peculiarity, and either losing or gaining an extra hand. Not all of the participants 
reported sensory changes during the procedure, indicating that individual differences may 
be important.   
 Individual differences are likely to play a part in the generation of pain especially 
as a result of innocuous stimuli. A factor that has been shown to influence pain report is 
response expectancy. These participants presumably respond to the suggestion that they 
might be in pain in the same way that people will start to scratch if the presence of fleas is 
indicated.      
   Expectations that a drug will relieve pain is likely to lead to reporting of reduced 
pain sensation.  High expectancy for suspected analgesic drug efficacy has been found to 
reduce reports of pain (DePascalis, Chiaradia, Carotenuto, 2002) as well as reducing pain 
perception in headache patients (Classen, Feingold, Netter, 1983). Expectancy of pain may 
play a role in the reporting of pain in the absence of external noxious stimulus although it 
is unlikely to provide a comprehensive explanation.  
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1.7. Acute Pain Symptoms with no obvious cause  
Most of the focus of pain without injury is on long term pain, because pain that 
disappears with no medical intervention places no burden on the medical systems. Acute 
pain is usually generated by physical injury and is thought to last for around one month 
(Merskey and Bogduk, 1994). However, acute unexplained pain is also common (Barsky 
and Borus, 1999).  Transient physical symptoms such as headache, fatigue, back pain and 
stomach upset, continue to occur in otherwise healthy populations (Ricci, Chee, Lorandeau 
and Berger, 2007). In one study, around 60% of symptoms including pain reported at a 
doctor‘s surgery in Holland were unaccounted for by physiological problems (Van Hemert, 
Hengeveld, Bolk, Rooijans, et al., 1993), although prevalence for chronic pain disorders is 
much lower and ranges from 0.5% to 5% in developed countries (Angst, Brioschi, Main, 
Lehmann et al., 2006). Diagnosis is predominantly based on self report of pain persisting 
for 12 weeks or more without an identifiable biomedical cause (Schweinhart, Sauro & 
Bushnell, 2008).  
Unexplained painful symptoms pose a problem for current pain theories which 
assume that pain is generated primarily from organic pathology. The triggers for 
unexplained acute pain are unknown, as few studies to date have generated sensations of 
pain without injury in an experimental environment.   
1.7.1 Mass Psychogenic Illness 
 
Evidence that somatic symptoms can occur without physical origins and in a social 
environment is documented by case studies of ‗mass psychogenic illness‘ (MPI). MPI 
refers to the signs and symptoms attributed to an external cause rapidly exhibited by 
individuals in the same group (Jones, Craig, Hoy, Gunter, et al., 2000).  In the year 2000, a 
high school teacher noticed a smell of gasoline in the classroom and started to report 
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headache, shortness of breath, nausea and dizziness in front of pupils (Jones, et al., 2000). 
She was taken to hospital along with several students from the same class. During the same 
day, a further 100 people visited the emergency room with symptoms they believed to be 
due to toxic exposure. In total, 68% percent of people surveyed after the incidence believed 
the symptoms to be a result of the toxic exposure. Extensive investigation by 
environmental government agencies revealed no evidence of toxic substances in the 
atmosphere.   
 
Struewing and Gray (1990) reported a similar incident in a group of army soldiers 
who were hospitalized after believed exposure to toxic gases.  One thousand recruits 
developed at least one symptom after the exposure, 375 received further medical attention 
and eight were hospitalized reporting symptoms such as shortness of breath, sore throat 
and chest pain. Extensive investigations revealed that, as in the case reported above by 
Jones et al. (2000), there was no evidence of toxic gas in the atmosphere.  It is possible, 
although unlikely because of the number of cases without explanation, that pollutants did 
exist but were not correctly identified. Aldous et al. (1994) reported that a high number of 
school girls exhibited common mass psychogenic illness symptoms like nausea, vomiting 
and stomach pains, however cucumber pesticide contamination was attributed to the bout 
of illness.   
Unexplained somatic symptoms are also not isolated to toxic environmental 
hazards. Halvorsen, Crooks, LaHart and Farrell (2008) highlight the case of itching 
contagion during an outbreak in an infant school. Initially several pupils in one classroom 
began to complain of itching and irritation to their skin.  Over the next few days 93 visits 
were made to the health room with complaints of itching; similar to the examples above 
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there was no obvious initial cause for the itching. Days later reports of itching or skin 
redness returned to normal. 
1.8 Shared somatic experiences 
Shared somatic experiences have only been found to be induced experimentally in a 
few cases. Observing the behaviour and sensations of others can lead to the experiencing 
of those sensations; for example, Pennebaker (1982) demonstrated that people were likely 
to scratch if they observed another scratching.  In a more recent study, Mazzoni, Foan, 
Hyland and Kirsch, (2010) asked participants to inhale an inert substance which they 
believed caused four main symptoms: headache, nausea, itchiness and drowsiness. Half of 
the participants observed a confederate inhaling the same toxic substance. Mazzoni et al.  
demonstrated that participants who observed the confederate inhaling the substance and 
reporting symptoms in front of them were more likely to report physical symptoms 
themselves. The exact mechanisms for this contagious spread of symptoms are unknown, 
however it is likely that individuals who were open to the experiences of others were more 
likely to experience symptoms. A possible limitation of this study is that observation of 
inhaling the substance and reporting of symptoms was conflated. It is possible that just the 
reporting of symptoms is enough to confirm the adverse effects of the believed toxic 
substance and not the role of observation of another per se.  
1.8.1 The development of somatic symptoms  
 
Observing somebody else experience illness is sufficient to modulate future 
experiences of symptoms associated with illness (e.g. pain) (Turk, Guise and Carter, 1983). 
Koutanji, Pearce and Oakley (1998) demonstrated a relationship between familial pain 
symptoms and the participants‘ own pain reports. For example, if participants reported the 
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incidence of headaches, joint or muscle pain in their family then they were more likely to 
experience those specific symptoms. It is unclear whether social learning or genetic factors 
underpin reports of pain linked to family models of pain. However, support for the social 
learning of pain has been demonstrated experimentally, for example, Levy, Jones, 
Whitehead, Feld et al. (2001) demonstrated greater predictive value of social learning 
factors over genetic factors using questionnaires with a sample of over 10,000 twins.  
Turkat, Guise, and Carter (1982) exposed a group of participants to a confederate with low 
and high pain tolerances. Participants exposed to high pain tolerances exhibited higher pain 
tolerances from baseline in comparison to the group who had observed the confederate 
with low pain tolerances. Research on exposure to painful events suggests that those who 
observe painful symptoms are more likely to report painful symptoms throughout their life. 
The development of these somatic symptoms can also be observed in toddlers (Wolff, 
Darlington, Hunfeld, Verlhurst, Juddoe, et al., 2010). The development of these pain 
symptoms appear to be shaped by their meaning and interaction with others (Bandura, 
1977).  
 1.8.2 Affect and symptom reporting 
  
Kirwilliam and Derbyshire (2008) have provided evidence that pain is reported in 
the absence of any noxious stimulation. They did this by priming participants with pictures 
of unpleasant stimuli (mutilation, pain, etc.) or neutral stimuli (everyday items and 
scenery) using the dot probe task. Afterwards, participants reported whether they felt pain 
or heat in response to a series of heat pulses. Participants primed with unpleasant images 
were more likely to report the heat pulses as painful and were more likely to report feeling 
a pulse, and feeling it as painful, even when no pulse was delivered. The findings 
demonstrate that, after we see unpleasant stimuli that are likely to evoke a short term 
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negative emotional state, we are more likely to experience pain even in the absence of a 
noxious stimulus.  The findings could be due to greater attention or associated 
hypervigilance to pain stimuli evoked by the initial unpleasant images (Sullivan, Martel, 
Tripp, Savard and Crombez, 2006).  This paradigm demonstrates that acute pain 
experience can be reported in the absence of noxious input.  
1.9 Response expectancy and pain without injury  
Vicarious somatic symptoms are largely described as a social phenomenon, and are 
often associated with suggestion or response expectancy summarized in this quote ―those 
who accepted the idea (somatic symptoms) succumbed and those who were indifferent to it 
were immune‖ (Goh, 1987, p. 67).  Expectation of a painful event has been found to elicit 
reports of pain; for example Schweiger and Parducci (1982) told participants that they 
were to receive an electric current to their head. In the absence of any electrical current, 
participants still reported headaches, presumably because they expected to feel pain. 
Gollub, Pollish, Kirsch, LaViolette, Vangel et al. (2008) demonstrated that induction of 
pain through expectation resulted in reports of pain and also corresponded to areas of the 
pain matrix believed to code affect (medial pain system) typically during the presence of a 
noxious stimulus. Gollub et al. (2008) suggest that, because of the activation of the medial 
pain system, processing of pain induced by the expectancy of pain is predominantly 
modulated by affective processing.  Support for affective processing during expectancy of 
pain has also been found using physiological measures. Heart rate recorded during pain 
experience induced by pain expectation correlates with pain unpleasantness but not with 
pain intensity (Rainville, Carrier, Hofbauer, Bushnell et al., 1999).  
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1.10 Affect and observation of others in pain  
Observing another in pain has also been associated with affective components of 
pain. Watching somebody else injure themselves is likely lead to an understanding of what 
that pain is like, often expressed by ―ouch, that hurt‖ or, ―I felt that‖, etc. These types of 
reactions are commonplace but Singer et al. (2004) showed female participants cue cards 
that signalled their partner was about to be hurt. In this condition, activation was found in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the insula, areas commonly activated when 
participants directly experience a noxious stimulus. In a similar study, Jackson et al. (2005) 
showed participants images of other people in common painful situations (e.g. chopping 
their finger whilst preparing food or trapping their hand in a door). Jackson et al. also 
reported ACC and insula cortex activation. These findings imply a shared emotional 
response when observing another in pain that is mediated via activation of the ACC and 
insula.   
1.10.1 Embodied simulation 
 
 An empathic response, for example, being brought to tears by observing an actor in 
an emotional scene of a film, is a shared representation between the observer and the 
observed. Evidence supporting the idea of shared representation in social interaction has 
emerged from perception-action research. Single cells are found to fire in the prefrontal 
cortex of the macaque in response to observing goal directed actions as well as performing 
goal directed actions (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). The finding that observation of action evokes 
an identical response to that of carrying out the action has given rise to the idea of a mirror 
system within social interaction (Stamenov and Gallese, 2004). Mirroring or modelling of 
social behaviours is the principle that underlies the embodied simulation (Gallese, 2001). 
Generally, embodied simulation suggests that perceiving the state of another evokes a 
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representation of that state in the observer (Decety and Lamm, 2007) and is based on the 
idea that perception and action have shared properties. For example, shared properties have 
been demonstrated not only with actions but also with emotions like disgust. Wicker, 
Keysars, Plailly, Royet, Gallese et al. (2003) asked participants to smell unpleasant odours 
that elicited disgust and watch others smelling the same disgusting odour. They 
demonstrated overlapping activation in the left anterior insula when both inhaling and 
watching somebody else inhale the disgusting odour. Observation of another experiencing 
disgust is coded with reference to how disgust is experienced in the first person 
perspective. Emotion is tightly linked to the sensory-motor systems; for example Aldophs 
(2000) highlights the cases of patients with lesions in whom the sensory-motor cortices 
were unable to recognise a variety of emotional facial expressions related to disgust.  The 
exact nature of the link between sensory-motor systems and observing somebody else in 
pain is unknown.  
1.11 Sensations and observing another in pain  
 Despite the evidence for a shared emotional response put forward by a collection of 
fMRI studies (Jackson et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004) there has been some research 
investigating the link between sensory and motor systems while observing others in pain. 
Avenanti et al. (2005) used TMS to evoke motor evoked potential during the observation 
of a needle being inserted into a hand. The findings demonstrated corticospinal inhibition 
of the muscles related to the injected hand and also a correlation between pain intensity 
and levels of inhibition. Thus Avenanti et al. (2005) demonstrated sensorimotor mapping 
when observing another person receiving a noxious stimulus. Bufalari et al. (2007) directly 
measured somatosensory-evoked potentials(SEP) when observers viewed a needle inserted 
into someone else‘s hand. They found an increase in the amplitude of the SEP when 
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participants observed the needle being inserted compared to observing the hand being 
touched by a cotton bud. There was also a positive significant correlation between the 
perceived pain intensity evoked by injection to the hand and SEP amplitude. These 
findings suggest that somatosensory activation is directly modulated by observation of 
another in pain.   
 There is increasing evidence that observation of pain modulates central processes 
associated with the emotional and sensory feel of physical pain in the observer. If 
observing pain in another can activate emotional and sensory regions of the brain, it is 
possible that at least some observers will have a phenomenological experience of pain.   
 Avenanti et al. (2008) investigated the specific effects of state and trait empathy 
upon modulation of motor evoked potentials. He found that state empathy interpreted as 
the perceived judgement of pain intensity in the model was inversely correlated with 
changes in motor evoked potentials. That is to say, participants who rated the stimuli as 
more intense demonstrated an increased motor inhibition. Given the differences in motor 
inhibition, it could be the case that participants may also have different behavioural 
responses to the pain of others.  
1.12 Touch Synaesthesia 
 A number of studies have investigated the experience of touch as a consequence of 
watching another person being touched. Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward (2005) 
reported the case study of a female who always felt touch when observing somebody else 
being touched. She reported that the feeling was quite normal and was quite surprised to 
find out that this was an unusual experience. Blakemore et al. (2005) termed this vicarious 
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experience ‗mirror-touch synaesthesia‘. S1 activation was observed during actual physical 
touch but also when the touch synaesthesia participant observed another being touched.  
 Bannissey and Ward (2007) further investigated touch synaesthesia by showing 
videos of other people being touched on the face while an actual touch was delivered to the 
participant‘s face.  Participants were asked to distinguish between actual touch to their face 
and touch felt as a result of watching somebody else being touched. Participants failed to 
distinguish between actual touch and touch evoked by observation. Touch synaesthetes 
also scored significantly higher than controls on the subscale of the empathy scale 
measuring cognitive abilities such as perspective taking (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-
Cohen and David, 2004).   
1.12.1 Synaesthesia and Pain  
 
 A body of research has recently emerged describing a phenomenon similar to 
mirror-touch synaesthesia. Instead of the sensation of touch being generated by the 
observation of touch, the sensation of pain is generated by the observation of pain. 
Fitzgibbon, Guimmara, Kianistianis, Enticott and Bradshaw (2010) discuss pain generated 
in the absence of injury in terms of ‗pain synaesthesia‘.  Synaesthesia is usually described 
as a confusion or crossing of senses (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001).  Graheme-colour 
synaesthesia is the most common form of cross-modal synaesthesia (i.e. colour experience 
generated by the observation of letters or numerals). The term pain synaesthesia will not be 
adopted in this thesis because it is problematic. Observing another in pain causes an actual 
sensation of pain in oneself.  Seeing pain and feeling pain or a sense of what it is like for 
that person to be in pain is not similar to other accounts, or more traditional accounts, of 
synaesthesia. On presentation of a painful stimulus it is advantageous to assess the 
potential harm of a stimulus. When we see something painful happen like somebody 
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tripping over or a footballer sustaining a sporting injury, we are likely to some extent to 
share their experiences. We understand what it is like to feel pain and we to some extent 
feel what it is like to experience that pain. People with sensitive teeth feel pain and find it 
difficult to look at somebody eating ice cream because it hurts them. There is an apparent 
motivational significance for sharing a pain experience. In contrast, perceiving Tuesday as 
―yellow‖ or tasting a bitter taste at the same time as hearing a C# note, which are common 
examples of synaesthesia, has no particular relevance or motivational significance with 
respect to the original stimulus. The eliciting stimulus and perceptual experience do not 
share any obvious experiential qualities.  
 On the other hand, a visual experience of pain and a physical experience of pain 
share many experiential qualities as demonstrated by the empathy for pain literature (e.g. 
Jackson et al. 2005; Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004). Observation of something 
or someone evokes emotional and/or visceral/physical qualities. For example, observing 
somebody eating an insect may evoke feelings such as disgust or surprise in the observer.  
Listening to a song is not just an auditory experience; it can produce a range of emotions 
and create changes in mood.  Painful visual stimuli, whether in real life or depicted in 
pictures, result in a number of experiences generally described under the umbrella of 
empathy. Goubert, Craig, Vervoort, Morley & Sullivan et al. (2005) divide the factors 
involved in the sense of knowing what it is like to for another to be in pain into two main 
areas: affective responses (oriented towards self, personal distress and oriented towards the 
other, sympathy, empathy) and behavioural responses (withdrawal and reassurance). 
Knowing what it is like for another to be in pain requires external factors such as the extent 
of the injury, facial expression, context and top down factors like past pain experience, 
sensitivity to pain, etc.  
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1.13 Case studies of pain in the absence of injury 
 Although there is much evidence to suggest that touch can be felt during the 
observation of touch, there are no studies reporting that pain can be felt during the 
observation of injury. A number of case studies, however, have reported pain in people 
expecting or observing an injury.  Fisher, Hassan, & O‘Connor (1995) reported that a 
builder felt excruciating pain after accidently stepping down onto a 15 cm nail which went 
completely through his boot. The builder was sedated and given fentanyl upon arrival at 
hospital, but when his boot was removed it became apparent that the nail had not 
penetrated his foot at all. The nail had passed between his toes without any injury. 
Presumably the belief that the nail had penetrated the foot and the expected pain was 
enough to trigger a pain experience.  
1.13.1 Pain Flashbacks  
 
 More recently Whalley, Farmer, & Brewin (2007) described the case of a post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) patient who had been seriously injured during the London 
bombings of 7/7/2005. Each time that he received a cue about the bombing, particularly 
during therapy, the patient experienced varying degrees of pain. In the period since the 
injury he reported over 40 episodes of pain. One explanation for these pains is the 
reactivation of a pain memory (Katz and Melzack, 1990; Whalley et al., 2007) although, 
contrasting research using healthy volunteers has found little evidence of reactivation of a 
pain memory (Chen et al., 2008; Morley, 1993). It is likely that the associated severity of 
the injury and/or the traumatic, unusual circumstances surrounding the injury may play a 
part in the activation of pain in this case, and in phantom limb patients.  
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1.13.2 Watching another in pain generates pain sensation  
 
 Bradshaw and Mattingley (2001) reported the case of a man who felt pain in his 
hand when he observed his wife accidentally cutting her hand when preparing food. The 
man was a patient suffering from neuropathic pain and was also thought to have parietal 
lobe damage. Unfortunately, doctors were not able to ascertain the exact damage because 
the man died before scans were taken. Giummarra and Bradshaw (2008) described similar 
vicarious pain experiences in a cohort of phantom limb patients. Phantom limb patients 
were asked in retrospect ―does anything trigger or cause your phantom limb sensations or 
phantom limb pain to emerge or change?‖  A small number of the phantom limb patients 
they have studied describe pain in their amputated limb when observing pain related 
stimuli such as facial grimacing, war and other traumatic events on television, or when 
hearing an unpleasant pain related story or event.  It is difficult to ascertain if there is any 
link between the phantom limb pain itself and pain that that is generated by visual 
/auditory information about others in pain. For example it is possible that imagination of 
pain triggers pain memories or experiences associated with or before amputation. 
Examples of pain without injury have not been reported outside of patients linked to 
trauma or have not been demonstrated experimentally.   
1.14 Thesis Summary  
 The cause of functional pain is unknown, only few studies have investigated 
mechanisms which generate pain without organic injury (e.g. Derbyshire et al. 2004). 
Functional pain is generally defined by an absence of identifiable tissue damage or brain 
lesion/abnormality. Organic pain however, is generated by tissue damage or by damage to 
part of the brain. For example, in the case of post stroke pain, lesions to parts of the pain 
pathway such as the thalamus or insula are associated with painful sensations isolated to a 
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single limb. Functional pain is distinct from organic pain as there is little evidence to 
suggest that pain generated in people who experience functional pain (e.g. chronic lower 
back pain and Fibromyalgia) stems from an organic problem. One of the main barriers of 
studying functional pain is the lack of methods of generating pain without injury. While 
this thesis does not specifically address the cause of functional pain, it will focus on the 
generation of pain without injury in healthy individuals which may contribute to our 
understanding of functional pain. More specifically, this thesis will focus on the generation 
of pain in healthy individuals by investigating how mapping between self and other and 
how that could potentially lead to an experience of pain.Research has demonstrated that 
observation of pain leads to a partial overlap between self representations and other 
representations. This is reflected both by shared brain areas with areas coding emotional 
aspects of pain and behaviourally by expressions of empathy or personal distress (e.g. 
―ouch, that hurt‖ or looking away) (Jackson et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004). To date, there 
has been no research with a healthy sample investigating the reports of physical pain 
without injury. The aim of this thesis is to investigate reports of physical pain during 
observation of others in pain. To do this, the second chapter will research the incidence of 
pain reports generated by the observation of pain and factors influencing the reports of 
pain. The third chapter will investigate the neural correlates of the pain generated by 
observation of others in pain. Chapter Four will investigate how reports of pain are linked 
to motor responses measuring reaction times. Chapter Five will investigate the perspective 
taking abilities of pain responders and Chapter Six will investigate the sense of body 
ownership in pain responders. Chapter Seven will discuss the implications of pain reports 
during the observation of pain. 
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CHAPTER TWO: PAIN SENSATION GENERATED BY OBSERVATION OF 
OTHERS IN PAIN
 
2.1 Introduction 
Several anecdotal cases have described pain sensation without apparent noxious 
stimulation. A patient with parietal lobe damage reported that he felt pain in his finger 
when observing his wife accidentally hurt her finger (Bradshaw and Mattingley, 2001). In 
another case, a builder reported severe pain in his right foot after jumping down onto a 15 
cm nail that seemingly passed through his foot. Careful removal of his boot revealed the 
nail passing directly between his toes with his foot entirely uninjured (Fisher, Hassan, 
O‘Connor and Minerva, 1995).  A male who suffered injuries because of bomb attacks on 
the London underground reported feeling over 40 flashbacks of pain sensation, especially 
when reliving the experience (Whalley, Farmer and Brewin, 2007). These case reports 
demonstrate that pain can occur because of sensory input that is not inherently noxious 
and, at least occasionally, pain might be directly shared with another person. 
Amputees who experience a phantom limb report pain sensation in the phantom 
evoked by the sight or imagination of another person in pain, or other pain related stimuli 
(Guimmara and Bradshaw, 2008). Fitzgibbon, Guimmara, Georgiou-Karistianis, Enticott 
and Bradshaw (2010) review the case of pain reports from amputees generated by visual, 
verbal or imaginatory painful information about another. Amputees were asked if their 
phantom pain was induced or worsened by any other known factors.  Eleven out of 280 
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participants reported pain generated by observing another person hurt themselves, 
observing pain related stimuli e.g. trauma, blood, etc., or thinking about others in pain 
(Guimmara and Bradshaw, 2008). In some cases phantom pain was worsened by 
observation of another in pain and in others it was entirely generated by the observation of 
another in pain. Phantom limb pain affected by observation of others in pain demonstrates 
that external inherently non-noxious visual stimuli can create pain. Fitzgibbon et al. (2010) 
label pain generated by observation of another in pain as ‗pain synaesthesia‘ and 
emphasise that this phenomenon has only been demonstrated in a clinical phantom pain 
population. The majority of phantom pain amputees had experienced chronic pain for up to 
13 years prior to amputation. Past pain experience is likely to influence ‗pain synaesthesia‘ 
but mechanisms involved in this new phenomenon are largely unexplored.  It is uncertain 
whether this type of painful experience occurred as a consequence of the amputation or 
whether ‗pain synaesthesia‘ was present prior to amputation and has been exacerbated by 
the phantom limb pain.   The demonstration of a group of phantom pain patients who 
retrospectively report pain generated by pain in others raises the question whether pain 
generated by observation of others in pain is prevalent in healthy individuals.  
   Generating pain without a noxious external input has been a barrier to 
understanding chronic pain. The long term presence of pain without injury characterises 
a large group of patients who are largely refractory to treatment (Barsky and Borus, 
1999).
 
The persistence, intractability and apparent lack of peripheral cause for their pain 
have led to an increasing interest in neuropsychological mechanisms (Borsook, 
Moulton, Schmidt, Beccera, 2007). A major barrier to understanding pain without 
injury, however, is the absence of techniques to generate pain without injury under 
controlled conditions. If there is an overlap between brain areas that code painful 
information when we observe others in pain, it is possible that in some cases observing 
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Figure 2.1 The images used to elicit pain for the behavioural study 
others in pain can lead to an experience of pain in the observer. Hence, this chapter will 
first explore whether healthy participants report pain when they observe another in pain.  
2.2 Method  
2.2.1 Participants 
 
108 (22 male; mean age 26.4, range 18-55) healthy participants provided informed 
consent and received course credit for their participation. We did not explicitly ask 
participants if they suffered from chronic pain as we assumed that the participants were 
healthy. All participants were free from neurological or psychological disorder.  
2.2.2 Visual Stimuli  
 
Seven 
images and 
three movie 
clips were 
selected from 
the internet 
using an 
image search 
facility. The selected images are illustrated in figure 2.1. The three movie clips included a 
person‘s hand receiving an injection, a tennis player turning over their left ankle and a 
soccer player breaking their right leg. 
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2.2.3.2. Numerical Rating Scales 
 
After viewing each image or clip participants were asked ―How much pain do you 
feel?‖ The scale was anchored at zero for no pain and at ten for most pain imaginable. 
There were a further two subscales of pain experience which referred to the intensity and 
the unpleasantness of the pain experience. Participants who reported pain were asked to fill 
out both pain intensity and pain unpleasantness scales. When no physical sensation was 
elicited, participants were only asked to complete the NRS scale (0-10) for the emotional 
qualities of the pain. Participants were asked to rate the levels of disgust, fear, sadness, 
unpleasantness and empathy on a numerical rating scale anchored from 0 (not at all)-10 (a 
great deal) (see appendix three). The same anchors were used to rate emotions associated 
with pictorial stimuli in the IAPS (Cuthbert, Bradley and Lang, 1996). The specific 
emotion labels were chosen because fear, disgust and sadness are three of the main 
emotions used to describe emotions elicited by pictorial stimuli in the international 
affective picture system (IAPS). Pictorial stimuli included in IAPS depict a range of scenes 
that could be classified as painful stimuli (e.g. body mutilation, dental procedures etc). The 
inclusion of additional emotional categories was an attempt to separate out a purely 
emotional response from a somatic response.   
2.2.3.3 State and Trait Empathy Questionnaires 
 
State empathy refers to a transient mood characterised by warmth and compassion 
evoked by a particular situation e.g. reading a story in which somebody is hurt or 
emotionally traumatised. State empathy was measured on a NRS from zero (no 
compassion, warmth or sympathy) to ten (the most compassion imaginable) scale by three 
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separate items i.e. compassion, warmth and sympathy. These constructs have internal 
validity (0.74) for measuring empathy (Oswald, 1996) (appendix three).  
The interpersonal reactivity index (IRI: Davis, 1980, see appendix one) is a 
commonly used multi-dimensional tool for assessing trait empathy with four subscales: 
empathic concern, personal distress, perspective taking and fantasy. The cronbach‘s alpha 
for those respective subscales are 0.64, 0.76, 0.70 and 0.69. Trait empathy refers to the 
predisposition of someone who responds to actions or events in an empathic way.   
Empathic concern and personal distress measure emotional aspects of empathy, and 
perspective taking and fantasy measure the cognitive components. 
2.2.3.4 The short version of the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack, 1987) 
 
 If participants reported experiencing pain then they were asked to fill out an 
additional inventory called the short version of the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack, 
1987). This questionnaire is important as it enables participants to elaborate qualitatively 
on their experience of pain. It is used in both clinical and laboratory settings and is 
considered a reliable (internal consistency 0.71) and valid tool for measuring pain 
experience (Melzack and Katz, 1994). The questionnaire has 15 pain descriptors (e.g. 
throbbing, shooting, gnawing, and sickening) linked to the sensory, affective and 
evaluative aspects of pain experience. The participant must choose the pain descriptor that 
best represents the feeling of pain evoked by the image.  They are also able to locate the 
sensation of pain by circling the most appropriate area of human figures on the 
questionnaire (see appendix two).   
  2.2.3.5 The somatic checklist 
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Individuals who report the incidence of multiple physical complaints of unknown 
origin are thought to have an increased awareness of their own bodily sensations (e.g. pain, 
nausea, vision problems, etc.).  Increased sensitivity or awareness of bodily feelings or 
sensations without obvious physical origin or sensations is known as somatisation 
(Mehling, Gopisetty, Daubenmeyer, Price et al., 2009). The expression of somatic 
symptoms is linked to increased emotional distress and to clinical disorders such as 
depression and anxiety (Charles, 2009) but often occurs without concomitant psychological 
disorders such as irritable bowel syndrome (Kroenke and Swindle, 2000). Physical 
symptoms without obvious pathology are common (Nimuan, Hoptof and Wesseley, 2001) 
with as many as 60% of patients attending medical clinics receiving no biomedical 
explanation for their symptoms (Nimuan et al., 2001; Van Hemert, Hengeveld, Bolk, 
Rooijans, et al., 1993). The most common acute unexplained symptoms are fatigue and pain 
(Kirkwood, Clure, Brodsky and Gould et al., 1982). A heightened awareness of bodily 
sensations, such as pain, is suggested to originate from top down control as opposed to 
afferent input.  Bogaerts, Van Eylen, Li, Bresselleers, Van Diest, et al. (2010) induced 
dyspnea (increased need to draw in oxygen) to varying degrees in a group of patients with 
medically unexplained symptoms and a group of controls. They demonstrated that 
symptoms associated with dyspnea were more frequently reported in the MUS group, 
despite the absence of any physiological changes.  Pain generated in the absence of any 
noxious stimuli is an unexplained experience presumably linked to top down control likely 
influenced by past experience (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010) and emotional processing (Singer et 
al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 2005). It is possible that pain responders are more likely to 
experience other unexplained physical experiences, such as blurred vision, stomach cramps, 
aches and pains and dizziness. These unexplained physical sensations may or may not be 
triggered by injury in others.  In order to assess whether pain responders feel and 
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experience sensation without obvious physical origin, participants were asked to complete 
the somatic checklist. The somatic checklist is a list of 13 different physical sensations (e.g. 
blurred vision, feeling faint and dizzy, trouble catching your breath, etc.) devised by 
Pennebaker (1982) (cronbach‘s alpha 0.76) and used to assess increased somatic awareness 
in patients with chronic fatigue syndrome (Wood, Bentall, Gopfert, Dewey and Edwards, 
1994).  Subjects respond with the extent to which these experiences occur, from one (not at 
all) to five (a great deal) (see appendix three). 
 
2.2.3 Procedure 
 
All participants first completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).Participants 
then viewed a computer screen at a comfortable distance of approximately one metre. A 
standardised set of instructions was used to explain the procedure. Participants were 
informed that they were to view a series of images and short movie clips. Immediately 
after viewing each image they were to report if they felt any sensation of pain while 
viewing the image. It was emphasised that the pain should be felt in the body and that 
general feelings of disgust or unease should not be recorded as painful. The participants 
were then shown the numerical rating scale (NRS) used to rate the pain (anchored at zero 
for no pain and at ten for most pain imaginable) and the short-form McGill Pain 
Questionnaire (MPQ) (see appendix two). 
 The investigator sometimes asked additional questions to clarify that the nature of 
the experience was somatic rather than visceral or emotional.  The nature of the vicarious 
pain sensation such as the location and the description of the pain, i.e. whether it was 
sharp, cramping, sickening, etc., were very important.  Due to the unpleasant nature of the 
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images it was likely that participants may feel nauseous or sick as a result. In an attempt to 
be more stringent and avoid confusion between pain and sickness/visceral discomfort we 
decided to discount all types of stomach pain. Pain reported in the stomach area may be 
more representative of a visceral, disgust type pain best described as an emotional 
response.  
Once the questionnaires were complete and the investigator was satisfied that she 
had sufficient information regarding the nature of the experience, the experiment continued 
with the next image or movie clip. In total, the experiment lasted 15-30 minutes depending 
on the range of responses.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Pain Reports 
 
          Thirty one of the 108 subjects felt pain in response to at least one of the ten images. 
We included both images and video stimuli in the initially in the experiment because we 
were unsure of what type of image would elicit feelings of pain. However as participants 
reported pain when they viewed both images and videos we refer to both the image and 
video footage together as painful stimuli. All 31 felt their pain in the same location as the 
observed injury. For example, if the subject observed a finger injury, he or she marked a 
cross on the finger of the figure on the MPQ.  The subjects selected a wide range of 
somatic descriptors from the MPQ. ‗Tingling‘ was chosen as a descriptor most often (21 
times) followed by ‗aching‘ (18), ‗sharp‘ (13), ‗shooting‘ (11), ‗throbbing‘ (8), ‗sickening‘ 
(5), ‗splitting‘ (5), ‗heavy‘ (5), ‗stabbing‘ (5) and ‗tender‘ (1).  
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The duration of the pain was described as lasting for a ―few seconds‖, ―fleeting‖ or 
―for a split second as soon as the picture appeared‖. The picture of the athlete with the 
broken leg generated the highest pain intensity (mean rating 3.7) and the most frequent 
pain reports (17 of the 31 responders reported pain in response to this picture) (see fig. 
2.2).  
The picture of the man fallen from his bike generated the lowest pain intensity 
(mean rating 0.5) and the least frequent pain reports (4 of the 31 responders reported pain). 
The average pain intensity reported by the responders across all the images was 1.9 
(SD=2.4). The average pain unpleasantness reported by the responders across all of the 
images was 2.8 (SD=3.0) and 1.1 (2.1) for non pain responders. 
 
Figure 2.2: Mean ratings for disgust, fear, sadness, unpleasantness and state 
empathy for subjects who responded with pain (pain responders) to at least one of the 
images or clips in comparison to mean ratings for subjects who did not report any 
pain (non pain responders).  
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Figure 2.3: Comments made by pain responders after completing the experiment and an 
example of the localised nature of the pain and how participants marked the McGill pain 
questionnaire after observing the images. 
 
Pain intensity, however, was not significantly correlated with state empathy 
(r=0.17), empathic concern, (r=-0.50), perspective taking (r=-0.35), fantasy (-0.33), 
personal distress (r=0.25), unpleasantness (r=0.03), fear (r=0.15), disgust (r=0.01), sadness 
(r=0.27), age (r=0.02) or gender (r=0.17).  
2.3.2 Somatic Symptoms 
 
An independent t-test was performed to investigate the differences on overall 
scores on the somatic checklist. Non pain responders reported slightly more 
experiences of somatic symptoms then pain responders (PR: M= 21.9, SD=3.3, NPR: 
M=23.1, SD = 5.7), however the difference was not significant between groups (t (49) 
= -.86, p > 0.05).  Forty-seven percent of participants in the pain responder groups 
reported that they experienced ―an ache in the last month that lasted longer than one 
day‖ compared to 35% of non pain responders.  
Subjects were asked if they get this type of pain in everyday life or at the 
movies. Most of the sample answered that they did get unexpected sensations of pain, 
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or explained that they cannot watch films or documentaries that include images or 
scenes of pain because of these accompanying pain sensations. Subjects spoke about 
their pain experience during observation of another in pain as if it was normal; 
something they assumed was representative of the population as a whole.  
2.4 Discussion 
            Here we demonstrate that a significant minority of participants reported pain when 
they observed another person in pain. Participants who responded to the images with pain 
will be referred to as pain responders.  This is the first study to demonstrate that physical 
sensations of pain are generated by observing another in pain in a sample of healthy 
controls, which adds to the existing body of literature reporting other vicarious sensations, 
such as touch (Bannissey and Ward, 2007; Blakemore et al., 2005).  Long term pain 
without injury is a problem that costs health systems millions of pounds each year. It is 
difficult to generate in a controlled experimental setting because there no techniques that 
induce pain without a noxious stimuli with the exception of hypnosis (Derbyshire, 
Whalley, Stenger and Oakley, 2004) or expectation (Kirsch and Lynn, 1997). Discovering 
a technique that reliably generates pain in healthy controls gives us a method to explore 
types of pain experience not obviously linked to tissue damage.   
                    Pain responders were able to indicate the exact location of the pain which 
suggests that there is a direct spatial mapping between the injury observed in the image and 
the pain experienced by the individuals.  Similar experiences have been demonstrated with 
touch (Blakemore et al., 2005; Bannissey and Ward, 2007), suggesting there may be a 
more general mechanism underlying the pain experience generated from images of others 
in pain. Mirror neurons, first discovered in action recognition research (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
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Gallese, and Fogassi, 1996) are often used to explain experience that is shared by both the 
observer and the observed, and have also been implicated in empathy for pain (Singer et 
al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2005).  Mirror neurons are generally used to describe an overlap 
between brain regions involved in both processing of self pain and the pain of others. In 
action recognition literature, mirror neurons respond to the action itself, not to the static 
body part (Jeannerod, 2004).  It is unclear what special mirror qualities neurons in the pain 
matrix possess, especially as mirror neuron activity is closely linked to action and not to 
static images. It is also important to consider that research into emotion and the MNS has 
received very little attention and is poorly understood (Agnew, Bakoo and Puri, 2007).  
              Whilst there is overlapping of brain areas involved in processing of pain in self 
and others it is assumed that self and other remain distinct; in other words, ―I am separate 
from the person that I am observing‖.  Research investigating self/other distinctions in 
which participants are asked to adopt either their own or another‘s perspective (Jackson et 
al., 2006) have separated out the different perspectives whilst processing pain in others 
using fMRI.  Different pain related areas of the brain process information related to self 
pain and other pain, which suggests that there is only a partial overlap between self and 
other when processing the pain of others. Reporting pain sensation after observing 
another in pain would suggest that there is more than just a partial overlap of pain related 
areas, as pain responders are sharing both emotional and physical pain qualities. In 
Chapter Three the neural correlates of pain experience generated by the pain of another 
will be addressed.  
            Observing pain in others leads to a variety of responses, feelings and behaviours. 
Goubert, Craig, Vervoort, Morley, et al. (2005) propose a model of pain observation that 
generates either other oriented distress (empathy/sympathy) or self oriented personal 
discomfort distress. Most studies have used stimuli depicting a needle into a hand which 
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has no contextual or social cues, and discussed shared neural regions associated with pain 
in self and other in terms of empathy for pain.  Assuming observing somebody else in 
pain leads to an experience of empathy may not be a useful model for further 
understanding of pain responders.  A wide variety of scores was recorded, but on average 
the scores for empathy were fairly low. Some participants laughed, some participants 
were shocked, and some had neutral facial expressions whilst observing an image of a 
broken arm. Noting the relatively low state empathy scores reported by both groups, 
empathy for pain when observing another in pain may not always be the case.   
             Pain responders report pain being generated automatically after they observe a 
physical injury, which could suggest that the pain sensation is generated due to extracting 
the sensory information about pain in a social context, not the unpleasantness associated 
with the pain (Avenanti et al., 2009).  The distinctions between the sensory and affective 
qualities are difficult to disentangle and are highly correlated with each other in pain 
generated by noxious physical stimuli (Price, 2000).  The division between sensory and 
emotional components of pain in observation of pain is more marked. Separating the 
sensory and emotional qualities of observation of pain is useful because the division 
enables us to break down aspects involved in the pain generated by viewing another in 
pain.  
               State empathy is significantly higher in pain responders compared to non pain 
responders, however it is uncertain as to whether empathy is driving the reports of pain or 
is a consequence of being in pain.    Loggia et al. (2008) demonstrated that a group of 
high empathisers (induced by an actor talking about the death of his girlfriend) 
experienced increased pain sensitivity compared to a group of low empathisers (induced 
by the same actor talking about how he deceived an old lady).  The results suggest that 
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empathic feeling towards another, not empathy for pain per se, generates increased 
sensitivity for noxious stimuli.              
         Overall trait measure scores of empathy did not correlate with pain intensity, a 
finding which has also been demonstrated by Jackson et al. (2005).  The IRI categorises 
types of empathic response into four main categories (described in the method section): 
the only subscale to reveal a near significant difference between groups was perspective 
taking.  Brain activation linked to somatosensory features of another person in pain has 
been demonstrated to interact with cognitive empathy or perspective taking (Cheng, Yan, 
Lee and Decety, 2008).   
                 It is possible that pain responders are more suggestible to feeling pain than 
most individuals. The following study will address the possibility that pain responders are 
more suggestible; that is, they feel a sensation of pain because of the suggestion that they 
will feel pain. Almost ten per cent of participants report pain when asked despite the 
apparent absence of any physically noxious stimulus or other reason for their pain.  These 
participants presumably respond to the suggestion that they might be in pain in the same 
way that people will start to scratch if the presence of fleas is indicated (Pennebaker, 
1982). 
                   Innocuous stimuli are often rated as more unpleasant when participants expect 
to feel painful stimuli and this is linked to increased activity in pain related areas such as 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and insula (Sawamoto, Honda, Akado, Hannakawa, et 
al., 2000).  High expectancy for suspected analgesic drug efficacy has been found to 
reduce reports of pain (DePascalis, Chiaradia and Carotenuto, 2002) as well as reducing 
pain perception in headache patients (Classen, Feingold and Netter, 1983).  Suggestion is 
unlikely to fully explain the reports of pain, because pain responders did not respond to 
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every image. If pain responders are able to report pain to some images and not to others, 
then they are most likely responding to the individual features of the images and not to the 
suggestion of pain posed in the question. Around 30% of participants reported pain, which 
is much higher than the percentage of participants expected to respond simply because of 
suggestion.  
 
It is possible that participants were experiencing pain during the experiment, 
perhaps as a result of a long standing or recent injury, however, participants did not show 
any behavioural signs of pain or mention it in conversation during the experiment. It is 
therefore unlikely that participants were experiencing additional pain. However, even if 
there was a small percentage of the sample that were experiencing pain at the time of the 
experiment it is unlikely that as the chronic pain alone, was driving the reports of pain.  
                  Pain responders report higher levels of negative emotions when observing 
images of others. Negative emotions such as fear, unpleasantness and disgust are 
implicated in the generation of painful sensations in the absence of peripheral input, as 
demonstrated by Kirwilliam and Derbyshire (2008).  Stimuli showing fear, disgust, anger 
or pain have been shown to increase subjective pain reports (Wunsch, Phillpott, Plaghki, 
2003). The link between pain and emotion is further supported by evidence to suggest that 
emotional distress experienced for another activates limbic areas of the brain, thought to 
underpin emotional processing, as well as the processing of pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman 
and Williams, 2003). Negative emotions in general have a decreased effect on pain 
tolerance, but observing images of bodily injury have been demonstrated to increase pain 
intensity significantly more than unpleasant stimuli depicting scenes without bodily injury 
(Godinho, Magnin, Frot, Perchet and Garcia-Larrea, 2006).  The bodily injury in the 
images included in this study, and the subsequent pain sensation associated with the 
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images, suggest that the painful content of the stimuli is driving the response of pain. 
However, it is possible that the emotional states induced by the images also influence pain 
reports, and it is important to control for this. The next experiment will match participants 
for emotional states induced by the painful images in order to better establish the role of 
emotion processing and pain reports to pictures.  In Chapter Three we will also use 
images depicting negative emotional stimuli but no bodily injury as well as the images 
depicting bodily injury to try and delineate factors associated with pain evoked by 
observation of pain in others.  
              It is possible that the pain images are judged by the pain responders as more 
painful, causing increased activation of areas of the pain matrix thought to be implicated 
in pain processing (Singer et al., 2004).  Activation of areas of the pain matrix prior to 
noxious stimuli is thought to be implicated in increased pain sensitivity to noxious stimuli 
(Loggia, Bushnell and Mogel, 2008). We will explore whether pain responders judge the 
actor in the painful stimuli to be in more pain than non responders and subsequently 
process this type of painful stimulus differently to non pain responders in the following 
experiment. 
2.5 Experiment Two 
2.6 Introduction 
In Experiment One we discussed how pain responders respond to painful images. 
In the following study we investigate two factors that may influence reports of pain when 
observing others in pain: memory for pain and judgements of pain in others.  
2.6.1 Pain Judgements 
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Pain is commonly appraised as a warning of bodily damage or threat to the self 
(Crombez, Eccleston, Baeyens and Eelen, 1998).  There is a considerable degree of 
variation in pain experiences generated by a single noxious stimulus. There are many 
proposed reasons to explain differences in pain perception; for example, pain experience 
can be mediated by the perceived threat value of the stimulus. Perceived threat or pain 
value is likely influenced by the predisposition in some individuals to pay greater 
attention to a painful stimulus. Increased attention towards noxious stimuli is thought to 
increase pain experience, in the same way as lack of attention towards the painful stimuli 
decreases pain experience (Crombez, Eccleston, Baeyens and Eelen, 1996a; Miron, 
Duncan and Bushnell, 1989). Recent research has also reported varied judgements on the 
pain of others, e.g. Hadjistavropoulos and Craig (2002) state that perceiving pain in 
others is influenced by contextual, psychological and behavioural factors (Sullivan, 
Thorn, Haythornthwaite, Keefe, et al., 2001).   
 
 Individuals who perceive an unrealistic threat (e.g. catastrophisers or 
individuals who are hypervigilant), are more likely to overestimate the pain of others 
compared to individuals who score low on these constructs (Martel, Thibault, Roy, 
Catchlove et al., 2008).   Over-exposure to patients expressing pain likely leads to an 
underestimation of their pain (Prkatchin, Soloman, Hwang and Mercer, 2001) and 
has also been linked to reduced brain activity in somatosensory cortex (Cheng et al., 
2008; Decety, Yang and Cheng, 2010) responsible for processing intensity and 
location of the stimuli (Price, 2000).  Increased perceived intensity of pain in others 
has been found to be linked to decreases in motor preparation, a marker of coding the 
visual pain properties in others (Avenanti et al., 2005; 2006).  Given the link between 
judgements of pain intensity and physical changes linked to processing the pain of 
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others, it may be the case that perceived pain intensity in others influences the reports 
of pain in others.   
  
  Reporting pain to an image of another in pain is very unusual and has only 
been recently reported in a small proportion of phantom limb patients (Fitzgibbon et 
al., 2010) and by a significant minority of participants in the initial pilot study. The 
unique example of pain without injury generated by another in pain raises a question 
as to how pain responders perceive pain in others. It is possible that pain responders 
overestimate the pain of others in comparison to those who do not report pain when 
they observe another in pain.  Images of others in pain may be inherently more 
painful for pain responders than non pain responders which in turn may have an 
effect on pain sensation.  
 
2.6.2 Memory for painful events and observation of pain 
 
Memory for painful events is adaptive; remembering the pain of touching 
something hot prevents us from repeating the same action, in turn avoiding injury (Flor, 
2000). Whilst it is critical we learn to predict and avoid painful stimuli, memory for pain is 
likely to influence future pain experiences (Jantsch, Gawlitza, Geber, Baumgartner et al., 
2009).  In some cases memory of past traumatic painful events can spontaneously trigger 
pain. Whalley, Farmer and Brewin, (2007) report the incidence of painful flashbacks in the 
victim of the 7/7 London bomb attacks. Salomons, Osterman, Gagliese and Katz (2004) 
also report the incidence of two patients who, years after experiencing an episode of 
awareness during analgesia, experienced pain flashbacks similar to the pain felt during the 
period of consciousness.  Salomons et al. (2004) stated that the pain flashbacks were 
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triggered by visual stimuli similar to that involved in the original surgery.  Fitzgibbon et al. 
(2010) also reported cases of phantom limb patients who reported pain sensations in their 
phantom when they observed another person in pain. The pain is said to resemble pain felt 
in the limb prior to amputation.  The ability to empathise with another‘s pain has been 
linked to past experiences of pain (Preston and de Wall, 2002). It is possible that pain 
responders report pain as a result of a reactivation of pain memory directly linked to the 
pain content in the picture.  
2.7 Method 
2.7.1 Design  
 
A one way between-participants ANOVA was performed for group (pain 
responders, non pain responders and emotional responders) on each of the items included 
in the questionnaire such as level of discomfort and intensity of the pain judgements made 
by the participants.  
In order to assess the association between the frequency of painful memories and 
reports of pain, a Pearsons chi square was performed on yes/no responses to whether 
participants had experienced a similar type of pain depicted in the image and yes/no 
responses to whether they felt pain when viewing that picture.  
2.7.2 Participants 
 
Nineteen female pain responders (Mean age =20.3, SD= 1.2), 20 female non pain 
responders, (Mean age, 20.1, SD = 1.1) (low emotion) and 13 female non pain responders 
(19.8, SD= 0.7) (matched with pain responders for emotional judgements of the images), 
with no history of psychiatric illness, were recruited from an undergraduate psychology 
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course. The non pain responders were classified as emotional responders (non responders 
who reported no experience of pain) if they scored the same or above as pain responders on 
the three key emotions; disgust, sadness and fear. Matching the pain responders and a 
subset of non responders attempted to control for the role of emotions when observing 
others in pain. Participants gave informed consent and were debriefed after taking part in 
the study. All participants were free from neurological or psychological disorder.  
2.7.3 Procedure 
 
The procedure from experiment one was repeated with the inclusion of one 
new image and three new questions. Each image was displayed for six seconds, after 
which participants were asked to fill out questionnaires as per the procedure 2.2.3. In 
addition, participants were asked ―how much pain do you perceive the individual in 
the image to be in?‖ and ―how much general discomfort did you feel when observing 
the images?‖   In order to assess the issue of response expectancy linked to the self 
report in the questionnaire, an image of a healthy, uninjured, hand was included in 
the experiment. Participants were asked to rate the image in the same way that they 
rated the painful pictures. The inclusion of an uninjured hand is used to investigate 
the question whether the suggestion of pain can generate a pain response to an image 
that does not possess painful qualities. Participants were also asked if they had 
experienced the same type of pain depicted in the images, to investigate whether pain 
memories may play a role in the generation of pain evoked by others in pain. 
2.8 Results 
2.8.1 Pain Reports 
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Nineteen out of 53 participants reported pain to at least one image when viewing 
images of others in pain. The average pain intensity was 2.3. The mean number of images 
that elicited pain was 1.9. The pain descriptors are depicted in figure 2.4 below.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8.2 Pain Judgments 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed on all of the dependent variables (pain 
judgements, unpleasantness, discomfort, sadness, disgust, fear and empathy) to assess 
differences between the three groups. Pain judgement was the only dependent variable that 
was not significant (F (2, 52) = 0.9, p=0.40 ns.) There was a significant main effect of 
group for discomfort ratings (F (2, 52) = 14.5, p < 0.001),  unpleasantness ratings (F (2, 
52)=14.5, p < 0.001), sadness ratings (F 2,52,=4.2, p =0.01), disgust ratings (F (2, 52) = 
33.2, p < 0.001), fear ratings (F (2, 52) = 24.3, p < 0.001) and empathy ratings (F (2, 52) = 
3.8, p = 0.03) (see figure 2.5).  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Frequency of pain descriptors reported by the pain responders 
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Figure 2.5: Pain responders and emotional responders reported higher ratings 
compared with non responders on all measures except pain judgements. Asterisks 
indicate significant differences (*p<0.05, **p<0.001) and error bars show standard 
errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Post hoc tests (Bonferroni corrected p<0.05) reveal pain responders reported 
significantly higher ratings compared with non responders for discomfort (p < 0.001), 
empathy (p < 0.05), sadness (p < 0.05), disgust (p < 0.001), unpleasantness (p < 0.001) and 
fear (p < 0.001) (see figure 2.4). Emotional responders also reported significantly higher 
ratings compared with non responders on discomfort, (p < 0.001), fear (p<0.001), 
unpleasantness (p < 0.001) and disgust (p < 0.001). There was no difference between 
scores for non responders and pain responders across all measures (p > 0.05) except for 
fear. Emotional responders reported significantly more fear than non responders (p<0.001). 
Emotional responders reported higher ratings for sadness and empathy although the 
differences were not significant compared to non responders (sadness, p=0.09, empathy, 
p=.22)  
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Figure 2.6: The number of pain memories reported by pain responders is higher than both 
control groups. 
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2.8.3 Response Expectancy 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between individual response expectancy and 
pain, a Pearsons chi square analysis was carried out using the reported frequency of pain 
reports when viewing healthy images for each group. Six pain responders judged the non-
painful hand to be painful compared to 6 non pain responders matched for emotion and 
three non-pain responders. The number of participants who perceived pain when observing 
the healthy hand did not differ by group χ² (2, N = 55) = 2.9, p= .20.  
2.8.3 Pain Memories  
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates that pain responders report more specific pain memories when 
observing images depicting painful scenarios than both control groups; the association 
between memory and group was significant (χ² (2) = 8.2, p < 0.01).  
 
In order to investigate the relationship between individual pain memories and pain, 
a Pearsons chi square analysis was carried out using the reported frequency of pain reports 
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(pain responders only) and pain memories for the painful images. The association between 
pain report and pain memories was significant (χ² (1) = 49.3, p < 0.001).   
 
Table 2.1 illustrates that there were more pain reports from pain responders who had 
simultaneously reported a painful memory compared to those who had not reported painful 
memories. There were more painful memories in those who had reported pain compared to 
those who had not reported pain.  
2.9 Discussion 
In this experiment we demonstrated that pain is reported after observing others in pain. 
This replication of Experiment One provides further evidence to suggest that pain 
generated by observation of another in pain is a robust phenomenon. Pain responders did 
not perceive the painful images to be more painful than both non pain responder groups, 
suggesting that pain responders perceive or process painful stimuli similar to the two 
control groups.  Despite perceiving an equally painful stimulus, some participants 
reported physical sensations of pain. Extracting the sensory qualities of another‘s pain is 
essential to understanding and resonating with another‘s pain (Avenanti, 2007) but may 
be less important in the generation of pain evoked by the observation of others.  
Knowing or ascribing pain to a model may be very different to automatically resonating 
Table 2.1: Total count and percentage of pain responders who reported pain and painful memories (left),  
total count and percentage of pain responders who reported a painful memory and also reported pain. 
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or feeling what it is like for another to be in pain. Reporting more emotion in response to 
another in pain may be necessary for shared experience but not necessarily for shared 
pain sensation. Emotional responses generated by observing another in pain are identical 
in both a subset of non responders and pain responders. Therefore it is unlikely that pain 
sensation is strongly influenced by the emotional feelings generated by a painful image. 
Shared somatic representations allow us to share the pain of others through basic sensory 
mapping (Avenanti, 2007).  It would appear that stimulus driven information such as 
pain intensity is less important for sharing pain of others leading to the generation of 
pain. Sharing the pain of others likely relies on mechanisms that overlap self and other.  
2.9.1 Empathy and Pain Judgements   
 
Individuals who can share the experiences of another are more likely to perceive 
the event as more painful. The strong correlation between empathy for the model in the 
picture and the perceived pain experienced by the model is in line with the work of 
Avenanti et al. (2005), who demonstrated a relationship between the perceived pain felt by 
the model and suppression in corticospinal excitability. The extent to which motor activity 
is suppressed during observation of pain is thought to reflect the extent to which the pain is 
shared by the observer. Cortico-spinal excitability is suppressed during physical noxious 
stimulation in the same way it is suppressed during observation of pain.  Associations 
between empathic ability and the ability to infer pain in others have been found in previous 
studies (Danzinger, Prkatchin and Willer, 2006). For example although most individuals 
with a congenital insensitivity to pain (i.e. no personal experience of pain) were poor at 
predicting others‘ pain, those with greater empathic ability rated perceived pain in others 
similar to a group of controls with normal pain experience. The ability to empathise with 
another is likely to improve accuracy for judging pain in others and bring about an overlap 
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between self and other. In cases where pain sensation is evoked by observing another in 
pain, a complete overlap between self and other is achieved. It is possible that personal 
experiences of pain may influence the extent to which self and other overlap.  
2.9.2 Memory and Pain  
 
Support for the idea that personal experiences may influence the report of pain is 
provided by our second main finding. Here we demonstrate that pain reports are more 
likely to be accompanied by a pain memory. Painful memories are also more likely to be 
reported when pain sensation is evoked by an image. It is likely that experience of painful 
events influence how we perceive the pain in others; for example, individuals who have 
had very little experience of pain as a result of an insensitivity to pain at birth ascribed a 
lower pain rating when observing another in pain than controls with normal responses to 
external noxious stimuli (Danzinger, Prkatchin and Willer, 2006).  Presumably personal 
experiences of pain and, in turn, somatic representations of that pain, result in less 
understanding of the pain and lower pain ratings. It is possible that pain responders are 
better at empathic processing or sharing another‘s experience, not because they are other 
oriented (putting themselves in the shoes of another), but because their own past 
experiences are re-activated by the sight of another in pain.  The images may act as a 
trigger for re-activation of past pain experiences in the same way that reliving traumatic 
events in therapy has been found to elicit pain sensation (Whalley et al., 2007). In the only 
other case of pain generated by observing others in pain, Guimmara and Bradshaw (2008) 
reported that a small group of phantom limb pain patients experience pain that is very 
similar to pain they have experienced previously, always induced by watching or listening 
to talk about a pain experience. Reports of pain in the case of phantom limb patients are 
linked to past experiences of pain. The research discussing pain memories outlines cases 
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where pain has occurred under very unusual, traumatic and stressful experiences, often a 
symptom of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is an anxious psychological state 
that can arise after exposure to trauma (e.g. war, terrorist attacks, sexual abuse) and is 
particularly characterised by flashbacks to the traumatic event (Jones and Wessely, 2003). 
It is unlikely that images of fairly common painful events such as leg breaks, injections 
and/or bruises would be inherently traumatic in the same way as more severe or stressful 
life events.  However it is possible that observing somebody break their leg or hit their 
head would result in feeling that pain in the same way that observing sad events can aid 
recall to personally sad events.   It is plausible that more experience of pain increases 
attention towards pain related stimuli. Chronic headache sufferers, for example, exhibit 
more attention to images depicting headache compared to healthy controls (Schoth and 
Liossi, 2010). The current literature on cortical reorganisation suggests that experience 
with pain likely strengthens representations of pain in chronic pain sufferers (Flor, 2003).  
 It is possible that pain memories or pain experiences may strengthen or make 
painful information more salient. When we observe another person in pain, mirror 
representations of that pain are more readily accessed. Related to the mirror system 
specifically, short term memory traces via observation of movement have been 
demonstrated (Stefan, Cohen, Duque, Mazzochio and Celnik, et al., 2005) to influence self 
produced movement. For example, a thirty minute observation of movement produced 
memory representations similar to representation produced by physical practice of 
movement. It is plausible that a similar mechanism might underpin representations of pain 
evoked by observation of others in pain.  
2.9.3 Response Expectancy  
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Finally, pain responders were just as likely to attribute the same levels of pain 
intensity to an image of a healthy hand as non responders. The negligible difference in pain 
judgements between pain responders and non responders provides some evidence to 
suggest that the pain reports are not influenced by suggestion or expectancy of pain.  Pain 
responders were not more likely to rate an image as painful when the images depicted a 
healthy hand. However it is hard to directly compare pain responders with non responders 
because non pain responders do not report pain. It is possible that pain reports are 
influenced by a more automatic expectancy of pain in response to observing another in 
pain, in the same way that the expectation of noxious stimuli can generate pain sensation 
(Fisher et al., 1995; Schweiger and Parducci, 1982). If participants reported pain because 
of response bias then it is likely that participants would have discriminated between the 
different images. Participants only reported pain to a select few images, therefore it is 
likely that participants were reporting pain in response to the salient painful features of the 
image and not because of a particular response bias.      
 
2.10 Experiment Three 
2.11 Introduction  
In Experiment One, pain responders demonstrated no differences compared with 
non pain responders in reporting somatic or physical symptoms. Here we investigate more 
general anomalous experiences generated in the absence of physical input. Reports of pain 
not linked to noxious stimuli are difficult to categorise and understand. Most perceptual 
experiences are tied to particular physical properties e.g. sound waves are linked to 
hearing, puncturing of the skin to pain sensation, sodium ions to the taste of saltiness, etc. 
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When sensations occur without the presence of a physical stimulus, they are often referred 
to as hallucinatory or anomalous experiences. Without the presence of an obvious cause, 
pain is commonly labelled as ‗psychosomatic‘. The term psychosomatic is often used to 
describe pain sensations thought to originate psychologically or from the mind, with no 
accompanying physical problem.  
 
Bodily sensations, distortion of body shape and time, changes in sensory intensity 
and verbal hallucinations are all categorised as anomalous perceptions on the Cardiff 
Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS) (Bell, Halligan and Ellis, 2006). Anomalous 
perceptions which include hearing voices, sensing the presence of someone when no one is 
there, and the occurrence of burning or other unusual sensations are examples of symptoms 
displayed in psychosis and other mental disorders (Bell et al., 2006). The concept of a 
continuum for psychosis, as opposed to psychosis as a discrete entity, has lead to an 
interest in the prevalence of symptoms typically associated with psychosis in the general 
population. Using the CAPS scale, Bell et al. (2006) found that 11.3% of a large non 
clinical sample reported experiencing a higher incidence of perceptual anomalies than a 
clinical sample. Other perceptual anomalies, such as visual, olfactory or gustatory 
hallucinations, are also reported in a small percentage of the general population (Johns, 
Nazroo, Bebbington and Kuipers, 2002; Ohayon, 2000). Whilst there has been some 
attempt to look at individual differences, mainly focusing on trait empathy and past 
experience, there has been little focus on how the individual comes to report pain. The 
prevalence of unusual sensory distortions in the general population raises the question of 
whether pain generated by the observation of another in pain is symptomatic of a more 
general distorted perceptual processing.  
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Figure 2.6: reproduced from Bell et al., 2006 showing distribution of CAPS scores 
in both a control and clinical sample. 
 
2.12 Method 
2.12.1 Participants   
 
Ten (mean age 19, SD: 0.5) pain responders and twelve (mean age 18.8, SD: 0.8) 
non pain responders who had taken part in the initial pilot study were invited to take part in 
a questionnaire based study. All participants were debriefed following completion of the 
questionnaire. 
2.12.2 Procedure and scale 
 
               2.11.2.1 Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS)   
 
The CAPS scale is a 32 item questionnaire devised to assess anomalous experiences in 
the general population, validated with a large non-clinical sample (see appendix four). The 
cronbach‘s alpha is 0.87. The items relate to three different categories of perceptual 
anomalies which are temporal lobe experience, chemosensation and first rank symptoms of 
psychosis. Temporal lobe experience is a blanket term for unusual experiences frequently 
described after temporal lobe epileptic seizures and not specifically related to psychosis 
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(Bell et al., 2006; Gloor, 1990). In fact, some of the perceptual anomalies experienced 
during temporal lobe seizures are also found in the general population (Persinger and 
Makarec, 1987). Experiences range from distortions in time perception, feelings of 
familiarity and hallucinations of music and sounds (Gloor, 1990). Items on the 
questionnaire associated with temporal lobe disturbance include ―do you ever find your 
experience of time changes dramatically?‖ and ―do you sense the presence of another 
being, despite being able to see any evidence?‖ Chemosensation refers to olfactory and 
gustatory hallucinations, which, compared to visual hallucination, are relatively uncommon 
in psychosis.  Experiencing tastes and smells that are not actually there are the most 
common hallucinatory experiences to occur in the general population (Ohayan, 2000). 
Examples of items related to chemosensation are ―do you ever notice that food or drink has 
an unusual taste?‖ and ―do you ever experience unexplained tastes in your mouth?‖ The 
final component of the questionnaire assesses unambiguous markers of schizophrenia 
known as first rank symptoms (Peralta and Cuersta, 1990). Items relating to this 
component are ―do you ever see things that other people cannot?‖ and ―do you hear your 
own thoughts repeated or echoed?‖  The scale is answered using yes or no to each of the 32 
events (0 low and 32 high) and then expands to ask to what extent each of the anomalous 
experiences are distracting and distressing, and the frequency at which they occur. 
Distress, distraction and frequency are marked out of five for each item, resulting in a total 
possible overall scale score of 180. 
2.13 Results 
2.13.1 Overall CAPS score 
 
CHAPTER TWO: PAIN SENSATIONS GENERATED BY OTHERS IN PAIN  
 
59 
 
Table 2.2 The range of responses on all four measures on CAPS for pain responders and 
non pain responders. Brackets show the average range reported by a sample of 337 
healthy controls reported in Bell et al. (2006).  
 Range for Pain Responders 
(average as per Bell et al.2006) 
Range for Non Pain Responders 
(average as per Bell et al.2006) 
Distraction 11-49 (0-77) 1-21 (0-77) 
Disturbance 12-63(0-88) 1-22 (0-88) 
Frequency 10-69 (0-88) 1-19 (0-88) 
Total CAPS Score 7-21 (0-26) 
 
1-11 (0-26) 
 
 
Figure 2.7 shows that pain responders reported significantly more perceptually 
anomalous experiences than non pain responders (t (18) = 3.9 p < 0.001). Pain responders 
reported more symptoms on the CAPS total score and also reported elevated scores for the 
extent to which those symptoms were distracting (t (18), 3.7, p < 0.005) and disturbing (t 
(18), 3.9, p < 0.005) as well as to how often they occurred (t (18), 3.2, p < 0.005).  
The most common symptoms reported were sensing the presence of another being despite 
being unable to see any evidence, having increased skin sensitivity to touch, heat and cold 
compared to normal and being aware of odours that other people are not aware of. Nine out 
of ten pain responders reported the above symptoms for each item. Figure 2.7 also provides 
more information on how the three most common perceptual anomalies were experienced. 
Although we were unable to statistically compare the results from Bell et al.‘s (2006) study 
it is clear that all pain responders report more occurrences of anomalous experiences than 
the average number of symptoms aggregated from a group of over 300 controls. 
 
CHAPTER TWO: PAIN SENSATIONS GENERATED BY OTHERS IN PAIN  
 
60 
 
 
2.13.3 Pain sensation and CAPS 
 
 
Figure 2.7: The mean score for anomalous experiences reported (max score 32), how 
distracting participants found the anomalous experiences (max score 180), how 
disturbing participants found the anomalous experiences (max score 180) and how 
frequently they occurred (max score 180).  
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Table 2.3: The correlation between the frequency of pain reports and 
total number of CAPS anomalous experiences. 
 Distress Distract Frequency Total CAPS 
Frequency 
of Pain  0.085 0.41 0.53 0.64* 
*p≤0.05) 
 
Due to the large differences in overall CAPS scores between pain responders and 
non pain responders further statistical analysis was performed in order to assess the 
relationship 
between pain 
responders and 
CAPS scores.  
A two tailed Pearson coefficient correlation was computed to assess the 
relationship between the number of images that evoked pain and the total score on CAPS. 
A higher total CAPS score was associated with higher frequency of pain reports. There 
was significant positive correlation between the two variables (r =0.6, n = 10, p = 0.04), 
illustrated in table 2.3. 
2.13 Discussion 
Here we demonstrate that perceptual anomalies are significantly more common in 
pain responders than non pain responders. The most common perceptual anomalies were 
feeling the presence of another person, smelling odours that were not noticed by another 
and heightened skin sensitivity, experiences not related to pain sensation per se.  In an 
earlier study we demonstrated that somatic symptoms were very similar across groups. 
While ratings of physical symptoms are comparable to a group of non pain responders, 
CAPS scores reported by pain responders were twice as high as non responders. This is 
evidence to suggest that pain generated by observing another in pain is mediated by a 
general distorted perceptual processing and not distorted pain processing per se. Pain 
sensations have been described in a very rare cohort of patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, characterised mainly by distorted perceptual processing (Bell et al., 2006; 
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Bar, Gaser, Nedanic and Sauer, 2002). It is unclear whether the painful somatic 
hallucinations are triggered by external sources or whether they occur spontaneously.  
However, the painful symptoms generally lasted for seconds or minutes and consisted of 
sharp and stabbing pains. A case study demonstrated that painful hallucinations were 
correlated with primary sensory cortex activity generally responsible for coding the 
intensity components of pain (Bar, Gaser, Nedanic and Sauer, 2002), in the same way that 
visual and auditory hallucinations are linked to activation in the respective visual and 
auditory cortex (Lenox, Park and Medley, 2000; Ffytche, Howard and Brammer, 1998). 
This report does not suggest that types of anomalous experiences are indicative of 
psychopathology in pain responders (Brugger, 2002). As many as 11% of individuals from 
a healthy sample report similar levels of perceptual anomalies as a clinical sample with 
psychosis (Bell et al., 2006).  
The mechanism underpinning pain sensation generated by others in pain is 
unknown, but there is increasing evidence to suggest that altered integration of multi-
sensory information, underpinned by a lack of distinction between self and other may play 
a role.  Patients with visual hallucinations rated no difference in sensations produced by 
tickling themselves or when they were tickled by someone else, suggesting that self and 
other generated tickles feel the same. Usually self produced tickles or touches are not felt 
as ticklish compared to tickles generated by someone else (see review Frith, 1996). 
Abnormalities in the self monitoring of self produced touch have also been demonstrated 
in patients with Fibromyalgia, a syndrome characterised by widespread pain of unknown 
origin (Karst, Meyer, Gueduek, Hoy, Borsutsky, 2005). Both fibromyalgia patients and 
patients with visual hallucinations failed to distinguish between externally and internally 
generated touch sensations. The similarities in tactile discrimination between self and other 
generated actions was comparable in patients with Fibromyalgia and Schizophrenia; they 
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are likely to share similar underlying mechanisms which may be implicated in the 
generation of pain (McCabe et al., 2005). The inability to discriminate between the 
sensation produced from being touched and seeing touch also suggests some self/other 
confusion (Bannissey and Ward, 2007). The discussion of clinical disorders such as 
Schizophrenia is used as an example of a population who exhibit a high degree of 
anomalous experiences.  It is important to point out that it is the presence of auditory 
hallucinations and not the diagnosis of ‗Schizophrenia‘ itself that is indicative of deficits in 
self monitoring (Blakemore et al., 2000).  CAPS is a relatively new measure and has only 
been used in healthy samples (Braithwaite, Sampson, Apperley, Broggia and Hulleman, 
2010) and has not been tested with Fibromyalgia patients; as such, the relationship between 
anomalous experiences and functional pain states is unknown.  
The small number of participants included in this questionnaire based study is a 
limitation; however, the higher than average CAPS scores may tentatively imply that pain 
responders have distorted perceptual processing possibly related to multisensory 
integration.   The lack of differentiation between self and other produced actions is thought 
to be underpinned by deficits in self monitoring of intentions illustrated by the feed 
forward model of action (Frith, 1996). It is possible that observing pain in others blurs the 
distinction between representations of others pain and self pain.  In the next Chapter we 
will investigate the extent to which self experienced pain and pain evoked by observation 
of others share common areas of brain activation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: NEURAL CORRELATES OF PAIN SENSATIONS GENERATED BY 
OBSERVATION OF OTHERS PAIN  
 
3.1 Introduction 
A series of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have 
demonstrated that observing another person in pain, or knowing that a loved one is in pain, 
can activate brain areas known to process the emotional qualities of pain (Morrison, Lloyd, 
Pellegrino and Roberts, 2004; Singer, Seymour, O‘Doherty, Kaube, Dolan et al., 2004). 
Brain areas associated with coding the location and intensity of pain, in contrast, are only 
occasionally reported when observing another person in pain (Jackson, 2006; Lamm et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, Lamm et al. (2007) have reported activation of primary (S1) and 
secondary (S2) somatosensory cortex when asking participants to rate pain intensity when 
viewing a needle entering a hand. S1 was more strongly activated when participants were 
specifically asked to evaluate intensity relative to affect. Thus, modulating attention 
towards others‘ experienced pain intensity activates somatosensory areas similar to when 
subjects orient towards the intensity of a felt pain (Kulkarni et al., 2005). 
There is also evidence, however, that observing pain includes a shared sensory 
component even when attention is not overtly modulated (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, and 
Aglioti, 2005; Avenanti, Pauello, Bufalari and Aglioti, 2006; Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di 
Russo and Aglioti, 2007). Volunteers observing a needle entering a right hand, for 
example, had reduced motor evoked potential in their right hand, which indicates 
appropriate somatomotor preparation following observation of injury (Avenanti et al., 
2005; 2006). In a further study, Avenanti et al. (2006) demonstrated a greater reduction in 
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MEP when subjects observed a needle entering the skin relative to observing pinpricks on 
the skin. These results demonstrate that somatomotor preparation is modulated by the 
intensity of the observed stimulus. A series of EEG studies also suggest modulation of 
somatosensory evoked potentials when observing pain in others (Bufalari et al., 2007, Fan 
and Han, 2008). Thus there is a growing body of research to suggest that vicarious pain is 
linked to somatosensory processing, implying that both emotional and sensory components 
of pain might be shared when viewing another in pain, and pain might be fully experienced 
because of vicarious observation. No study to date, however, has investigated whether pain 
sensation is experienced as a direct consequence of viewing another in pain. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
  
Participants who reported pain to at least one of the seven images were invited to 
take part in a further fMRI study. Ten participants (4 male, mean age 27.5) provided 
consent for this further study. A further ten (4 male, mean age 24.6) participants who had 
not reported pain to any of the images or clips also provided consent for the fMRI study. 
Participants were paid £15 for completing the fMRI procedure. 
3.2.2 Visual stimuli  
 
Prior to the fMRI study, the seven pain images were matched to seven non-pain 
emotional images selected from the international affective picture system (Lang, Bradley 
and Cuthbert, 1999). . The images included in the non pain emotion-matched images 
depicted scenes of war, violence and trauma (e.g. a man holding a gun to another man‘s 
head, a scene depicting an army invasion) (see appendix five).   
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Fourteen new participants were asked to observe the pain images and a series of 
emotional images and rate each image for emotional qualities (unpleasantness, fear, 
disgust, sadness). Emotional images that were rated as equivalent to the pain images were 
selected for use in the fMRI procedure.  
3.2.3 fMRI procedure 
 
Brain activation was inferred based on measurement of the blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) contrast (Ogawa, Lee, Kay and Tank, 1990). These measurements 
were acquired at 3 Tesla using a Philips system. T2* weighted MR signals were measured 
using gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (repetition time TR = 3000 ms, echo 
time TE = 2000 ms, FoV = 220 mm, 40 slices, 2.75 isotropic voxels). For each functional 
run, 215 dynamics were acquired from the AC-PC line. Structural images were acquired 
using T1TFE technique (TR=8.4, FoV=232mm, flip angle=60
o
 288x 288 matrix, 175 
slices). 
Following acquisition of the structural image, each participant completed two 
functional runs lasting 643 seconds and then a further series of shorter runs for a separate 
experiment that will be reported elsewhere. Participants viewed a series of images: (1) 
images of people experiencing pain; (2) scrambled versions of the pain images; (3) images 
depicting emotional situations matched for emotional content with the painful images; and 
(4) images depicting neutral situations matched for content with the painful images. This 
procedure is illustrated in figure 3.1 
. 
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Figure 3.1 Part of a functional run with the 4 image conditions illustrated from left to 
right: pain image, scrambled pain image, emotional image and neutral image. 
 
The sequence consisted of 28 trials (seven pictures or instructions to imagine in 
each condition). Each trial consisted of a fixation crosshair (six seconds), followed by one 
of the four conditions (six seconds) and then a variable period to rate experience (ranging 
from eight-14 seconds). Order of stimuli presentation was rotated and each set of stimuli 
was presented once per participant. Immediately after each image, participants were 
instructed to rate how much pain they experienced and then how unpleasant they found the 
image or the imagining. Ratings were delivered using a slider connected directly to CHEPS 
(Medoc, Israel) using the Computerised Visual Analogue Scale (COVAS), which was 
placed in a comfortable position on the participant. Participants familiarised themselves 
with the slider in a short practice session prior to scanning. During the practice session the 
experimenter explained that the start point (left hand side) referred to ―no pain‖ and the 
end point (right hand side) referred to ―worst pain imaginable‖. COVAS ratings were 
recorded online via CHEPS.  
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis was performed using the FMRIB Software Library (FSL release 4.1 - 
Oxford Centre for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Brain), described in 
detail elsewhere (Smith et al., 2004). In summary, head movement between scans was 
corrected by aligning all subsequent scans with the first. Each re-aligned set of scans from 
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every subject was coregistered with his or her own hi-res structural MRI image, with the 
non-brain components edited out, and reoriented into the standardized anatomical space of 
the average brain provided by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). To increase the 
signal to noise ratio and accommodate variability in functional anatomy, each image was 
smoothed in X, Y and Z dimensions with a Gaussian filter of 6mm (FWHM). 
A box-car model with a hemodynamic delay function was fitted to each voxel, 
generating a statistical image corresponding to condition. Baseline drifts were removed by 
applying a high-pass filter. Brain regions with a large statistic correspond to structures 
whose BOLD response shares a substantial amount of variance with the induced changes 
in the participant‘s experience. Critically, direct contrast of the brain response during the 
pain images with that during the emotional images provided an estimate of brain activation 
during pain experience excluding attendant emotional processing. The multiple 
comparisons problem of simultaneously assessing all the voxel statistics was addressed via 
cluster based thresholding. Clusters of voxels that exceeded a Z score>2.3 and P<0.05 
(corrected for multiple comparisons) were considered statistically significant. For display 
purposes, images are thresholded at Z>2.3 and k>3.  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Behavioural Data  
 
Behavioural data collected from the two fMRI groups (responders and non-
responders) are shown below in table 3.1.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: NEURAL CORRELATES OF PAIN SENSATIONS 
 
69 
 
Table 3.1 Disgust, pain intensity, unpleasantness and state empathy scores for pain 
responders and non-responders recorded during the behavioural experiment. All ratings 
were from 0 (nothing experienced) to 10 (maximum pain intensity, unpleasantness or state 
empathy). Non-responders were selected for their lack of pain experience during 
observation and no pain was reported by any of the non-responders to any of the images or 
clips. 
 Disgust Pain Intensity Unpleasantness State Empathy 
 
Responders 
 
3.2 (3.2) 
 
2 (2.4) 
 
2.8 (2.9) 
 
5.5 (3.1) 
Non-
responders 
 
3.7 (3.2) 
ns p=.30 
 
- 
 
1.3 (2.3) 
t = 4.03,  
(p < 0.01) 
 
3.7 (3.0) 
t = 4.01, 
(p < 0.01) 
 
3.3.2 fMRI Experiment 
 
 None of the non-responders reported any pain while viewing the images in 
the scanner, while the responders reported an average of three images as generating 
definite pain (mean rating 3/10). Contrasting the brain activation when viewing emotional 
images not depicting injury with those depicting injury should reveal pain related 
activation only for the subjects reporting vicarious pain. Critically, in subjects who do not 
report pain, the two images should produce a similar emotional reaction and a similar 
pattern of activation, resulting in little or no difference when contrasting activation across 
the conditions. This critical contrast is shown here. In summary, the responders 
consistently activated the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC), anterior insula, prefrontal 
cortex and S1 and S2 across all contrasts. The nonresponders consistently activated aMCC 
and prefrontal cortex but did not activate insula, S1 or S2, and occasional deactivation of 
the insula was observed.  
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Figure 3.2 illustrates that subjects reporting pain to the images depicting injury 
activate the ACC (especially the aMCC), insula, S1 and S2 in comparison with emotional 
(no injury) images, whereas subjects not reporting pain show little activation for the same 
contrast. 
The ROI data were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA to reveal a 
significant difference between groups for the overall profile of responses in these ROIs 
(F1,18=5.0, p=0.04). The interaction of group with region was also significant (F7,126=4.5, 
p<0.01). Post hoc t-tests revealed significantly greater responses in the responder group in 
right insular cortex (R IC), left insular cortex (L IC), right secondary sensory cortex (R S2) 
and left secondary sensory cortex (L S2). 
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Figure 3.2 Top left (A) illustrates a typical pain image shown to all subjects during 
fMRI. This image generated pain and emotion in the responders but only emotion in the 
non-responders. A typical non-pain emotion picture is shown to the right and a pain 
picture to the left. Subtracting the brain activation during the non-pain emotion images 
from brain activation during the pain images reveals regions of the pain neuromatrix 
(labelled) in the responders but not in the non-responders. These differences between 
the groups are shown below (B) thresholded at p<0.01 (uncorrected) to show the 
profile of difference. Whole brain analysis demonstrated significantly (p<0.05, 
corrected) greater activation in the responders versus the non-responders in the left 
prefrontal cortex (MNI coordinates: -4, 52, 32; Z(height)=5.2; k(extent)=698). The 
results of the ROI analysis are graphed at the bottom (C). Asterisks indicate significant 
differences (p<0.05) and error bars show standard errors. 
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 Responder > Non-
Responder 
  Non-Responder > 
Responder 
 
Figure 
label 
Brain Area 
(x, y, z coordinates) (region) 
Side Z-
Score 
Brain Area 
(x, y, z coordinates) (region) 
Z-
Score 
1 Prefrontal Cx 
(-4, 52, 32) (BA6/9) 
(7, 46, 32)  (BA 6/9) 
 
L 
R 
 
  3.6 
  2.9 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
2 S1 
(-57, -19, 43) 
(59, -6,  43)  
 
L 
R 
 
  3.0 
  2.3 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
3 S2 
(-53, 4, -4) 
(56, -26, 32) 
 
L 
R 
 
2.9 
2.9 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
4 aMCC 
(-5, 10, 33) 
(12, 29, 25) 
 
L 
R 
 
    2.7 
 2.1 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
5 Thalamus 
(-1, -16, 1) 
(30,  4,  0) 
 
L 
R 
 
2.6 
3.6 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
6 Brainstem 
(-9, -30, -16) 
(6, -34, -19)  
L 
 
2.8 
2.4 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
7 Cerebellum 
No observable difference  
No observable difference 
 
L 
R 
 
- 
- 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
8 A. Insula 
(-45, 2, 1) 
(38, 2, 9 ) 
 
L 
R 
 
2.8 
2.6 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
9 P. Insula 
(-49, 1, 0) 
(39, 1, 11) 
 
L 
R 
 
2.8 
3.0 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
10 Amygdala 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
L 
R 
 
- 
- 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
11 Hippocampus 
No observable difference  
No observable difference 
 
L 
R 
 
- 
- 
 
No observable difference 
No observable difference 
 
- 
- 
Table 3.2: Group differences for the regions with increasing BOLD response when 
comparing pain images with emotion images. 
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3.4 Discussion  
          Our study provides convincing evidence that a significant minority of normal 
subjects can share not just the emotional component of an observed injury but also the 
sensory component. These subjects describe observing at least some injuries as painful, 
and they activate regions of the brain known to be involved in pain (figure 3.2). Similar to 
previous work with hypnosis, the current study provides good evidence that these regions 
are not just passively recording injury or threats to tissue but are actively generating 
painful experience (Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger and Oakley, 2004). 
Previous responses to observations of non-noxious touch have also produced 
somatic (S1 or S2) activation, and our findings provide further support for the idea that 
mirror or empathic responses do not rely exclusively on motor imitation and can involve a 
shared sensory response (Avenanti et al., 2005;, 2006; Banissy and Ward, 2007; Valeriani, 
Betti, Le Pera, De Armas, Milliucci et al., 2008). Other investigators have also suggested 
that sources not typically considered noxious can generate pain, and that this experience is 
physical rather than metaphorical, or purely emotional, in nature (Eisenberg, Lieberman 
and Williams et al., 2003; MacDonald and Leary, 2005). Thus it is possible that at least 
some people might experience pain directly, even in a non painful scenario such as when 
observing another in pain. 
This finding was maintained despite extensive questioning of subjects and 
significant effort to exclude responses restricted to visceral, or general unpleasant, feelings. 
Pain descriptors provided by the subjects included a high frequency of clearly somatic 
terms such as stabbing, shooting, sharp and tingling. Supporting these subjective pain 
reports, brain activation was higher in all areas associated with the pain matrix for those 
who experienced pain compared with the non-responders who felt no pain. Studies 
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investigating the neural underpinnings of empathy have also generated activation in 
regions of the pain matrix (Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2005). In these studies, 
activation of the ACC and the insula was found when subjects viewed or anticipated 
somebody else in a painful situation, but the subjects did not actually report experiencing 
pain in these studies and sensory areas (S1 and S2) were not activated. There was also no 
significant correlation between reported pain intensity and empathy or unpleasantness or 
disgust. A shared emotion with another person in pain is often referred to as an empathic 
experience, but that experience might be quite different from a shared pain experience. 
While some people may readily share the emotional perspective of others ,that shared 
empathic experience might have surprisingly little relation to the shared experience of pain 
intensity demonstrated here. Others have also failed to demonstrate a significant 
correlation between trait empathy and measures of sensory experience (Jackson, et al., 
2005).  When S1 activation has previously been reported, the activation was stronger when 
subjects were specifically asked to focus on the intensity of the observed painful stimuli. A 
vicarious sensory painful experience, therefore, may be linked to attention and vigilance 
towards pain rather than to empathy.  
Overall, regions associated with the emotional component of pain were activated 
more strongly and consistently than regions associated with the sensory component. 
Specifically, activation was observed in the rostral, rather than caudal, regions of ACC. 
The rostral ACC is linked with the emotional component of pain and with observing pain 
in others, rather than with pain due to noxious heat or cold (Jackson, Rainville and Decety, 
2006; Vogt, Berger and Derbyshire, 2003). Subjects with high state empathy also report 
higher heat pain experience during noxious somatic stimulation (Loggia, Mogil and 
Bushnell, 2008). In our experiment, pain responders had significantly increased pain 
unpleasantness and state empathy. Thus, higher state empathy in our pain responders and a 
CHAPTER THREE: NEURAL CORRELATES OF PAIN SENSATIONS 
 
75 
 
stronger response to the emotional component of the image may drive a secondary somatic 
reaction that is felt as pain. On the other hand, although ACC activation was greater in the 
responders, this difference did not reach criteria for significance in the ROI analysis. It is 
possible that pain in responders is more dependent on a larger somatosensory response 
driving a secondary emotional response. Other imaging technologies such as MEG or EEG 
can formally test this speculation (Fan and Han, 2008). 
Here we have focused on the critical analysis comparing pain images with non-pain 
emotional images. Other contrasts generally support previous findings (Singer et al., 2004; 
Jackson et al., 2005; Lamm et al., 2007). However we failed to demonstrate insula 
activation in all contrasts. Previous studies using cartoon depictions have failed to activate 
the insula, possibly because the subjects failed to see the images as real (Fan and Han, 
2008). Our non-responders might also fail to see the images as ‗real‘ because of their 
extreme content, but this speculation will require further investigation to substantiate. It is 
also possible that the insula codes somato-sensory information (e.g. responsible for coding 
the location and intensity of pain experience).  
The precise nature of the individual differences driving pain experience in the 
responders remains open to further investigation. Previous studies have reported variability 
in pain empathy dependent on trait-cognitive empathy and personal distress (Avenanti et 
al., 2005), self-centred versus other-centred stance (Jackson et al., 2006), feelings of 
exclusion (Eisenberg et al., 2003) and catastrophising (Sullivan et al., 2006). Studies are 
ongoing in our laboratory to investigate whether responders can more readily adopt the 
perspective of the other and more readily incorporate a prosthetic limb into their body, 
results of which will be reported in Chapters Five and Six. We note that perspective taking 
did trend very close to significance in this study and that this difference and others might 
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be revealed as significant when using larger samples. A further possibility is that certain 
features of the images, such as the presence of a facial grimace (Saarela, Hlushchuk, 
Williams, Schurmann, Kalso et al., 2006) or a particular type or intensity of injury, 
contribute to the pain experience. 
The responder group did not respond with pain to every image and different images 
elicited pain across our responders. If future studies can identify the features of an image 
most likely to yield a pain response then it could be instructive to compare pain evoking 
versus non-pain evoking injury images. The current study demonstrates a considerable 
activation difference between responders and non-responders and the clearest behavioural 
correlate with that activation difference is the report of pain for at least some of the images. 
It remains uncertain whether there is a qualitative or quantitative difference when 
responders view injury images and report pain versus viewing injury images and not 
reporting pain. Our speculation is that the difference is quantitative (there is a threshold of 
some sort that responders are able to tip over) but we need further studies to substantiate 
that claim. 
Regardless of the precise mechanism of vicarious pain experience, our findings add 
to a body of evidence that pain can be experienced without injury. Our results go 
substantially further than previously, however, by directly associating the tendency to 
report a somatic noxious experience, when observing another in pain, with activation in 
both emotional and somatic regions of the brain. Such findings have important 
implications for our understanding of sensory experience in general and for pain in 
particular. Observation of pain directly generating pain, for example, could form part of the 
aetiology of functional pain. By increasing the understanding of pain without injury we 
might develop better insight into the mechanisms and causes of functional pain. 
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As similar areas of the pain matrix are activated for vicarious and physical pain, the 
perception action model of empathy is often used to explain the neural correlates of 
empathy (Preston and De Waal, 2002). This model states that there is a representation of 
the action that is directly shared and drives the shared experience. A smile, for example, 
provides information about the happy state of the person observed and, through motor 
mimicry, leads to a shared happy state. Our results, however, provide little support for a 
motor representation of pain. Observation of the subjects did not indicate any overt 
grimacing or bracing action and the fMRI results provided little indication of motor 
preparation or response. Nevertheless, other studies have demonstrated motor preparation 
using more sophisticated behavioural and TMS techniques (Avenanti et al., 2005; Bufalari 
et al., 2007). In the following Chapter we investigate overt motor responses in pain 
responders.  
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CHAPTER 4: OVERT MOTOR RESPONSES NOT MODULATED BY PAIN GENERATED 
VIA OBSERVATION OF ANOTHER IN PAIN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The pain system and motor system are very tightly linked (Sailer, Molnar, Cunic 
and Chen, 2002). A sudden sharp pain produced by stepping onto a tack, for example, will 
cause a reflex withdrawal of the affected leg (to prevent further damage) and a reflex 
stiffening of the other leg (to prevent the person falling over). These responses occur 
before any pain is consciously experienced to facilitate rapid escape from dangerous 
stimuli. Once pain enters conscious experience the need for further escape measures may 
become apparent. Conscious pain experience and volitional motor systems are also linked 
to promote survival by facilitating the avoidance of dangerous stimuli.     
The connection between pain and the cortical motor system is more complex than 
the activation of a spinal reflex. During painful experience both premotor and motor 
regions are activated to coordinate the preparation to withdraw and actual withdrawal 
(Sailer et al., 2002). Stimulation of the motor cortex, however, can also inhibit the 
transmission of noxious information in spinal pain pathways (Yezierski, Gerhart, Schrock 
and Willis, 1983), which suggests that the motor system influences somatosensory 
experience as well as motor responses to stimulation (Peyron, Laurent and Garcia-Larrea, 
2001).  
Further evidence that somatosensation and motor activity interact comes from 
studies demonstrating that noxious events can inhibit motor responses. Corticospinal motor 
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evoked potentials (MEPs) are inhibited during painful injection of hypertonic saline (Le 
Pera et al., 2001) and a reduction in corticospinal excitability is often associated with 
reduced motor preparation (Duque et al., 2005).  Kofler et al. (1998) also demonstrated that 
pain administered to the finger tips reduces motor neuron excitability (in the hand) but also 
increases motor neuron excitability in the biceps brachii (bicep).  It is possible that a 
decrease in motor preparation at the site of damage might prevent further damage to the 
affected limb whereas an increase in motor preparation in an adjacent limb facilitates 
defensive reactions.   
There is evidence that the complex relationship between the motor system and pain 
also exists when observing somebody else in pain (La Pera et al., 2001; Kofler et al., 
1995). Avenanti et al. (2005), for example, demonstrated that watching a video of a hand 
being injected decreases motor evoked potentials (MEPs) compared to watching a cotton 
bud touch the same hand.  Thus observing another person in pain influences somatomotor 
preparation. The inhibition of the MEPs presumably reduces the potential for movement to 
limit the possibility of danger to the observer (Leis et al., 2000).  
In a later study, Avenanti et al. (2008) again demonstrated that observing an 
injection reduced the MEPs in the congruent hand but increased the MEPS in the 
incongruent hand. That is, if participants observed an injection into a right hand the 
participants‘ right hand MEPs reduced while their left hand MEPs increased. These 
findings are analogous to those reported by Kofler et al. (1998) when directly delivering a 
noxious stimulus and suggest that observing a noxious event results in similar defensive 
reactions.  
The interactions of noxious stimuli and motor preparation are likely to influence 
reaction times for motor responses. Participants observing an image of a needle puncture, 
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for example, were quicker to release a key with their congruent hand compared with 
observing a cotton bud touch a hand (Morrison et al., 2007). The participants were slower, 
however, to press the key, indicating that observing an injury facilitates avoidance and 
inhibits approach. These effects were observed 500 ms after viewing the image but were 
not observed at 100ms. This difference was interpreted as reflecting the influence of top 
down cognitive or affective processes such as empathy or mechanisms related to empathy 
discussed in Chapter One. Empathy is the subjective experience that is often associated 
with observing another in pain but is much more likely to be a conscious, subjective 
experience than pain recognition.  The link between the motor system and empathy is not 
very well understood, however embodied simulation theory of empathy suggests that 
representations of others‘ actions and emotions are coded automatically and potentially 
provide a platform for empathic experience.  
Chapter Two demonstrated that observing another in pain evokes a feeling of pain 
in approximately one third of normal controls. Chapter Three also demonstrated that pain 
generated by observation of others is associated by S1 and S2 pain matrix activation. Other 
studies have also reported the experience of pain evoked by observation of pain in patients 
with clinical pain (Bradshaw and Guimmara, 2008; Bradshaw and Mattingley, 2001). 
Typically participants report this vicarious pain experience as immediate and automatic, 
but the precise timing and nature of the experience remains uncertain.  
Participants experiencing pain through observation will presumably have similar 
motor changes to those demonstrated by Kopfler et al. (1998) and Avenanti et al. (2005; 
2008). The changes in motor activity might, however, be more exaggerated in participants 
who respond with a report of physical pain compared with those who do not respond with a 
report of physical pain. In addition, if the responder pain is dependent upon top down 
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cognitive or affective processes, then the changes in motor activity might occur at around 
500 ms, similar to the changes reported by Morrison et al. (2007). Alternatively, if the 
responder pain is dependent upon visual information being rapidly integrated into the 
somatomotor system for pain, then the motor changes might be more rapid. Pain following 
a nociceptive stimulus typically causes brain activation at around 100 ms (Ploner et al., 
2006). Thus, if the visual stimulus acts like a noxious stimulus in pain responders, then the 
influence of that stimulus should be observed relatively early in pain responders.  
Automatic coding of the representations of others could form the basis of pain 
generated by observing another in pain.  As pain is being experienced then motor 
preparation to move away from the stimulus will be greater or completely inhibited.  The 
automatic sensation of pain is probably due to the short stimulus-response latency of 
painful information. Painful information is processed in the brain at around 100ms after the 
application of noxious stimulus (Ploner, Gross, Zimmerman and Schnitzler et al., 2006). If 
pain generated by an external stimulus is similar to pain evoked by noxious stimuli then 
there will also be decreased latency compared to non pain responders.  
Watching somebody else in pain generates context specific motor responses (Morrison et 
al. 2007).  Thus, it is expected that participants who feel pain when observing another in 
pain will demonstrate inhibition of motor preparation resulting in slower reaction times 
when moving towards a picture of injury compared with a neutral picture. This inhibition 
is also predicted to be greater in responders versus non-responders. Furthermore pain 
responders may have an earlier inhibitory response compared with non-responders. In 
order to investigate whether viewing time of painful images modulates the motor response 
we vary the duration of the image presentation.  
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Here two experiments are conducted to investigate the approach and withdrawal 
movements to pain observed in others at after different exposure times. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Experiment One 
 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
 
Twenty two right handed participants (mean age = 19.5, SD = 0.6, range 18-25) 
provided informed consent and took part in the study in exchange for course credit. 
Participants were categorised as pain responders if they reported pain after observing 
another in pain during pre-testing using the procedure described in Chapter Two. This 
resulted in 10 pain responders and 12 non pain responders.  Three participants were 
excluded for making errors exceeding 15%. All procedures were performed in accordance 
with local ethical regulations. 
4.2.1.2 Procedure  
 
Participants were asked to take part in a Go/No Go reaction time paradigm while sitting 
one metre away from a standard computer screen. Participants were asked  to rest their 
index finger on the space bar and were told to begin responding by either pressing or 
releasing the space bar when they viewed an image of another person‘s hand. They were 
asked to either rest their finger in order to press or they were told to hold down the space 
bar in preparation for releasing the key. Participants viewed three types of image: 1) 
images that depicted needles appearing to penetrate locations on the hand (‗needle‘ 
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images); 2) needles that were covered by a plastic cover touching locations on the hand 
and fingers (‗touch‘ images); and 3) images that displayed an individual hand (‗hand‘ 
images). All images were presented in third person perspective (see figure 4.1). 
Participants were presented with a fixation cross, followed by a screen displaying an 
orange or purple square. After the orange or purple square, an image was displayed. As 
soon as the image appeared participants were required to make a response.  Their response 
was made by pressing down or releasing the space bar with their index finger. A correct 
response was a press or release in trials when participants observed an orange screen (Go 
trials). A response was not required in trials when participants observed a purple screen 
(No/Go trials). The maximum time given to respond was 2000ms. Half the participants 
started by pressing down on the space bar (key release) and the other half started the 
experiment by resting their right index finger on the space bar (key press). Each 
experiment consisted of 180 trials divided into 2 blocks. The experiment lasted 
approximately 30 minutes.  
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4.2.2 Experiment Two 
 
4.2.2.1 Participants 
 
Twenty two healthy participants (4 male) (age range 18-23) from the university of 
Birmingham provided informed consent. Participants were categorised as pain responders 
if they reported pain after observing another in pain during pre-testing using the procedure 
described in Chapter Two. This resulted in ten pain responders and twelve non pain 
responders. All participants took part in the study in exchange for course credit. 
 
Figure 4.1: The experimental procedure for Experiment 1 and the three different types 
of stimuli. Right to left: 1) Hand presented without any stimuli 2) Touch stimuli (needle 
covered with a plastic top, touching the index finger 3) Painful stimuli (needle 
appearing as if it is piercing the index finger). Participants were instructed to press or 
release the space bar when viewing the image. 
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4.2.2.2 Procedure 
 
We adjusted the experiment to investigate the time course of the image presentation 
and its effect on motor responses. We presented the images for either 500ms or 
1000ms.Participants sat one metre away from a standard computer screen and were asked 
to rest their index finger on the space bar. The order  of the Go/No Go reaction time 
paradigm used in Experiment One was adapted to investigate the viewing time of the 
image (see figure 4.2) The participants were informed that they should begin responding 
by either pressing or releasing the space bar when they viewed an image of another 
person‘s hand.  
Each participant was asked to either rest their finger in order to press or to hold 
down the space bar in preparation for releasing the key. They were presented with a 
fixation cross for 500 ms followed by a screen displaying the image for either 500ms or 
1000ms (for a description of images see figure 4.2). A purple or orange screen then 
appeared, on presentation of the purple screen (No/Go trials) participants were instructed 
to inhibit their response i.e. no response was required. When the orange screen appeared 
(Go trials) all press or release responses were required as soon as the images were 
displayed. There were 360 trials in total presented in 3 (120 trials per block) separate 
blocks. Each block contained 80% ‗go‘ trials. The experiment lasted for 45 minutes in 
total. 
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Figure 4.2 The experimental procedure for Experiment 2 and the three different types of 
stimuli identical to Experiment 1. Right to left: 1) Hand presented without any stimuli 2) 
Touch stimuli (needle covered with a plastic top, touching the index finger 3) Painful 
stimuli (needle appearing as if it is piercing the index finger). 
    4.3.1 Experiment One   
A mixed effects 2 (action, press/release) x 3 (image, ―pain‖, ―touch‖,―hand‖) x 2 
(group, non pain responders, pain responders) ANOVA was performed to investigate the 
differences in correct reaction times across groups and conditions.  
       Overall, participants were slower to perform approach movements (key 
presses) (M = 533ms) than withdrawal movement (key releases) (M= 511ms). There was a 
significant main effect of action (F (1, 40) = 4.5, p < 0.05). Participants also took longer to 
respond after viewing an image of a needle compared to images of a needle touching a 
hand or an image of a healthy hand (Ms = 524ms, 476ms and 566ms respectively). There 
was a main effect of image (F (1, 40) = 28.2, p< 0.001). Post hoc (bonferroni corrected, p 
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<0.05) t-tests revealed that there was a significant difference between images of a needle 
touching a hand (―pain‖ condition), images of a capped needle touching a hand (p < 0.05) 
and a healthy hand (p < 0.05). There was also a significant difference between images of a 
healthy hand (p < 0.05) and a capped needle (―touch‖) condition (p < 0.05).There was no 
difference in overall reaction times between pain responders (M = 531ms) and non pain 
responders (M=515ms), as such, there was no main effect of group (F (1, 20) = 3.4, p = 
0.07).  
       The interaction between group and action was significant (F (1, 20) = 11.2, 
p < 0.05).  Post hoc paired t-tests revealed that pain responders were significantly slower to 
make key presses than key releases (t (20) = 2.7, p<0.05) but there was little difference 
between reaction times for key releases compared to key presses for non pain responders (t 
(20) = -1.0, p = 0.28) (see fig 4.3).   
 
 
Figure 4.3 shows reaction times for key presses and releases as a function of group.  
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Figure 4.4 shows reaction times for both groups in response to each image 
collapsed across response.  
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The interaction between group and image was significant (F (2, 40) = 5.2, p < 0.05) 
(see fig 4.4). Post hoc independent samples t-tests revealed that pain responders were 
significantly slower to respond after viewing an image of a capped needle touching a hand 
than non pain responders (t (20), = 4.1 p < 0.01). There was no significant difference in 
reaction times between groups after viewing an image of a healthy hand (t (20), -0.89, p 
=0.4) or when viewing a painful image (t (20), 1.7, p = 0.08).  
 
 
             
 
               
There was also a significant interaction between action and image (F (2, 40) 5.7, p 
< 0.05). Independent post hoc t-tests reveal that participants were slower to make key 
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releases when viewing an image of a healthy hand versus an image of a capped needle 
(―touch‖) (t (20), = 4.5, p < 0.01). Participants were slower to make releases after viewing 
painful images compared to images of a capped needle touching a hand (t (20) = -7.7, p < 
0.01) and after viewing images of a healthy hand (t (20) = 9.5, p < 0.001). There was no 
significant difference for key presses after viewing ―touch‖ images versus images of a  
healthy hand (t (20) = 1.2, p = 0.28) and painful images (t (20) = -0.53, p = 0.59). There 
was no significant difference between images of a healthy hand and painful images also 
when making key presses (t (20) = -1.6, p =0.1) (see fig. 4.5) 
 
 
Figure 4.5 shows reaction times after viewing each image type as a function of key press 
(Press/Release).  
            4.3.2 Experiment Two 
In order to investigate the effects of viewing time on key responses we adjusted the 
experiment to investigate the time course of the image presentation and its effect on motor 
responses. We presented the images for either 500ms or 1000ms. The correct mean 
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response times were processed in into an ANOVA using a 3 (image – ―needle‖, ―touch‖ or 
―hand‖) x 2, (motor response – press or release) x 2 (group – pain responders or non-
responders) x 2 (time- 500ms/1000ms) mixed factorial design. 
Participants took longer to make a key press (either press or release) after viewing a 
painful image (M=547ms), relative to an image of a capped needle touching a hand (M 
480ms) and a healthy hand (M= 526ms). There was a main effect of image (F (1, 20) = 7.4, 
p < 0.01). Post hoc (bonferroni corrected, p<0.05) t-tests revealed there was a significant 
difference between painful images and images with a capped needle touching a hand (p 
<0.05) but not between painful images and images of healthy hands (p=0.28). There was 
difference between reaction times when the images was presented for either 500ms (M = 
523ms) or 1000ms (M = 512ms), subsequently there was no significant effect of time (F (1, 
20) .46, p < 0.001). Participants were faster to make key releases (M= 476ms) versus key 
presses (M= 559ms), as such there was a main effect of response (F (1, 20) = 10.3, p < 
0.05).  
There was a significant three way interaction of image, time and response (F (1, 20) 
= 4.2, p < 0.005). In order to look more closely at the three way interaction of image, time 
and response two separate ANOVA analyses were carried out on each response 
(press/release).  
Participants were slower to make releases after viewing painful images (M = 
509ms) relative to a capped needle touching a hand (M=433ms) and images of healthy 
hands (M = 486ms), there was a significant main effect for image (F (2, 38) = 3.4, p < 
0.05). Post hoc (bonferroni corrected, p < 0.05) t-tests revealed a significant difference as 
participants took longer to make key releases after viewing a painful image versus a 
capped needle (p <0.05) but not a healthy hand (p = 0.46). Participants took longer to make 
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key releases after viewing a healthy hand relative to an image of a capped needle touching 
a hand, this difference was significant (p < 0.05). There was no interaction of image and 
time (F (2, 38) = 1.1, p = 0.34).  
Participants were slower to make key presses after they viewed an painful image 
relative to a capped needle and a healthy hand, there was a significant main effect of image 
(F (2, 38) 5.1, p < 0.05). There was a significant interaction of image and time (F (2, 38), 
5.1, p < 0.01). The means are presented in figure 4.6 below. Participants were quicker to 
respond after exposure to an image of a capped needle touching a hand, after exposure for 
500ms, compared with 1000ms, this difference was significant (t (19) = 3.4, p < 0.01). 
There was no significant difference in reaction times for key presses when participants 
viewed body parts (healthy hand) at 500ms or 1000ms (t (19) = -.06, p= 0.5). Participants 
took longer to make key presses after viewing a painful image for 1000ms compared to 
500ms, subsequently there was a trend towards significance (t (19) = -1.9, p < 0.06).  
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Figure 4.6 shows the mean reaction times for each image either presented for 
500ms or 1000ms.  
There was no difference in response patterns for pain responders compared with 
non pain responders and there were no other significant interactions.  
 
          
4.4 Discussion 
The first goal of this experiment was to investigate motor responses in participants 
who report pain (pain responders) when they see an image of another person in pain. 
Reaction times were slower during approach and faster during withdrawal in pain 
responders, but as a consequence of viewing an image of a capped needle ‗touch‘ 
condition, not a needle touching the skin ‗pain‘ condition. This result was contrary to the 
response specific effect on pain responders that we predicted, i.e. slower approach 
movements and faster withdrawal movements when a noxious event is observed versus a 
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non noxious event. Pain responders did not get response specific effects produced by 
inherently painful images immediately after viewing the painful images but did so for 
tactile stimuli. 
The response specific effects for tactile stimuli, relative to painful stimuli, is 
unexpected given that touch images depicted a needle covered by a plastic cap. Pushing the 
plastic cap against the skin is not inherently painful and is quite different to a needle being 
pushed against the skin, which is inherently painful. Response specific effects have been 
found to occur with painful stimuli, not touch or innocuous stimuli (Morrison et al., 2007). 
Pain responders reported that the images depicting a needle touching the skin generated a 
sensation of pain on their hands, therefore it is unlikely that the ‗pain‘ images are not 
perceived as painful.  It is possible that observing a capped needle is a novel image for 
most participants. The novel nature of the stimulus coupled with the short viewing time 
could mean that the image was perceived as ambiguous or as an unusual stimulus.  It is 
possible that an ambiguous or novel stimulus is likely to be more threatening than a painful 
stimulus. For example stimuli depicting threat (e.g. guns, knives, etc.)  have also been 
found to facilitate action (Flykt, 2006), reflected by faster reaction times after viewing 
pictures of threatening stimuli (snakes/spiders) compared with non threatening stimuli 
(flowers/mushrooms). We would expect to inhibit motor responses towards the threatening 
stimuli and this has not been tested other than with painful stimuli. These response specific 
effects are not present when the images are observed for either 500ms or for 1000ms, 
which is consistent with threat detection occurring very quickly after stimulus onset 
(Mogg, Bradley, Miles and Dixon, 2004). Factors such as hypervigilance have been 
demonstrated to mediate attention towards threat (Weinstein, 1995), and may play a role in 
the context specific response generated by observing tactile stimuli, although this is purely 
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speculative.  We assume the motor responses are modulated in the pain responders in 
experiment 4.1 because of hypervigilance to threatening information. Experiment One 
demonstrates for the first time that pain responders have a context dependent response 
which diminishes as stimulus duration increases, as a result of viewing non-noxious stimuli 
images, which is inconsistent with previous work by Morrison et al. (2007). 
The perception action model of empathy is often used to explain the neural 
correlates of empathy (Preston and De Waal, 2002). This model states that there is a 
representation of the action that is directly shared and drives the shared experience. A 
smile, for example, provides information about the happy state of the person observed and, 
through motor mimicry, leads to a shared happy state. Our results, however, provide little 
support for a motor representation of pain. The finding of this study suggest that while pain 
responders demonstrate motor inhibition, they do not demonstrate more motor preparation 
compared to non pain responders. It is possible that the pain generated by others in pain is 
driven not by simulation of others but potentially by a more generic or conceptual mapping 
between self and other.  Pain responders may have a strong preference towards an 
egocentric perspective and therefore may not simulate the pain of others but alternatively 
may re-live on their own pain experiences. Chapter Five will address self-other distinction 
in pain responders.  
The second goal of the experiment was to determine whether this modulation of 
reaction time began after viewing the image for 500ms or only after viewing the image for 
1000ms. Both pain responders and non pain responders demonstrated the same pattern of 
results in Experiment 4.2.  Avoidance responses, i.e. slower presses, were observed after 
viewing images of inserted needles versus images of a capped needle. The avoidance 
responses are unlikely to be related to the pain generated by images of others in pain 
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because both groups demonstrated the same responses. It is possible that after so many 
trials, the pain reported after observing another in pain habituates.  
Our speculation of an immediate pain experience similar to that experienced when 
receiving a noxious needle stimulus directly is not supported by this study. Motor 
inhibition following observation of pain is demonstrated here and is consistent with a 
number of studies suggesting an increased inhibition of motor responses.  Using TMS, 
Avenanti et al. (2005; 2006) have demonstrated that pain observation selectively inhibits 
the relevant muscles of the hand. Motor evoked potential (MEP) amplitude decreases 
during observation of a needled hand were specific to the body part observed and to the 
particular muscle observed, compared to observation of a needled tomato or observation of 
a cotton bud touching a hand. The decreased MEP amplitude during pain observation 
resembled the response to directly-experienced painful stimuli (Farina et al., 2003; Le Pera 
et al, 2001). This reduction in MEP supports the idea of a freezing response to limit harm 
to the affected limb during pain observation. 
The results demonstrate that all participants inhibit overt motor responses involving 
delayed approaches towards a painful image, but that they do not facilitate overt motor 
responses involving withdrawal from a pain image.  Similar to other studies, this 
experiment demonstrates that motor responses are inhibited (Morrison et al., 2007) by 
painful information. These results suggest that pain observation, but not pain generated by 
observing another in pain, can inhibit movement in the affected limb similar to when 
delivering noxious heat stimuli (La Pera, et al., 2001). This inhibition presumably serves to 
prevent further injury, as has been discussed in relation to noxious heat (Kopfler et al., 
1998).  
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Inhibition of motor responses towards our noxious images but not away from them 
is indicative of a lack of facilitation away from the stimuli. The results here might be a 
more general freezing response to another in pain, however, the relationship between the 
proximate and distal muscles and their role in inhibition and facilitation remains unclear. 
Complex interactions between arm and hand muscles have been demonstrated during pain 
itself (Kopfler, 2004), probably because motor responses to pain are influenced by 
descending mechanisms of facilitation and inhibition (Milan, 2002). We did not 
specifically investigate the relationship between hand and arm muscles during observation 
of pain, but we assume that the distal arm muscles may be overriding motor inhibition in 
the hand to prevent harm. Facilitating distal arm muscles would speed up the withdrawal of 
the hand from harmful stimuli (Kofler et al., 1998). In sum, the results here and elsewhere 
(Morrison et al 2007; Avenanti et al., 2005; 2006) provide evidence for the protective role 
of motor responses to real or potential pain but are not specific to pain evoked during 
observation of another in pain.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ROLE OF VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN PAIN WITHOUT 
INJURY 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In Chapter Two, we demonstrated that around one third of normal controls report 
pain when they are exposed to images of other people in pain. In Chapter Three we 
demonstrated that brain activity associated with pain experienced by the self is also 
activated during observation of another in pain. The mechanism generating this pain 
experience remains uncertain. One possible component is the ability to rapidly adopt the 
perspective of the person being observed. Pain responders might automatically orient their 
self perspective to that of the other and thus more readily share the other‘s experience. 
Here we investigate two types of perspective taking: visual perspective taking and spatial 
perspective taking, to test this possibility. 
5.1.1 Visual Perspective Taking  
 
Visual perspective taking refers to the ability to predict what another person sees 
(Michelon and Zacks, 2006). Increased ability to process information in the 1
st
 person 
perspective relative to the 3
rd
 person perspective suggest that visual perspective may play a 
crucial role in the representations of self and the representations of other (Jeanerrod and 
Anquetil, 2008). Visual perspective taking is usually categorised by two levels. Level one 
perspective taking refers to the ability to infer what someone can or cannot see. Level two 
perspective taking  refers to the understanding that the same visual scene can be perceived 
differently by others. Inferring that someone has a different perspective of the world is 
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broadly defined as mentalising (Hamilton, Brindley and Frith, 2009). Mind reading or 
mentalising refers to the ability to attribute mental states to others.  Aichhorn et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that temporal parietal junction (TPJ), an area commonly recruited in theory 
of mind tasks, was also active in visual perspective taking tasks. Aichhorn et al. (2006) 
suggested that that visual perspective taking and theory of mind tasks recruit similar 
regions because they both require the ability to recognise that others take a different 
perspective of the world. Performances in visual perspective taking tasks and mentalising 
tasks are both impaired in children with autism (Hamilton et al., 2009), a developmental 
disorder characterised by an inability to relate to others.  Successful social interaction 
requires inferring the visual and mental perspectives of others.  The ability to infer what 
another person can see implies disengaging from the self visual perspective and adopting 
the visual perspective of another (Samson, Apperley, Braithwaite and Andrews, 2008) and 
theory of mind (Samson, Apperley, Chaivarino and Humphreys, 2004). Self perspective is 
considered as a default egocentric bias that is corrected/ inhibited when trying to 
understand others (Morewedge and Keysar, 2004).  
A failure to inhibit own perspective can result in poor performance in visual 
perspective taking and mentalising tasks (Hamilton et al., 2009; Samson, Apperley, 
Kathirgamanathan, Humphreys, 2005). Reduced ability to inhibit self perspective has been 
associated with poorer performance on mentalising tasks (Bailey and Henry, 2008). Epley 
et al. (2004) demonstrate that self perspective was suppressed more quickly in some 
participants compared with others, suggesting that some individuals more readily adopt the 
perspective of others (Epley, Morewedge and Keysar, 2004; Samson, Apperley, 
Kathirgamanathan, Humphreys, 2005). Support for this view is provided by Tversky and 
Hard (2009), who asked participants to describe the relationship between objects with or 
without the presence of another person. Almost half of the participants described the 
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location of the objects from the others person‘s visual perspective even when there was no 
explicit instruction to do so.  It is plausible that at least a proportion of people will more 
naturally adopt another person‘s perspective. When participants observe others in pain, 
they are not instructed to take the perspective of another. It is possible that pain responders 
are able to map more quickly and easily than non-responders and that they are able to map 
across perspectives more quickly and easily than non-responders. In general, pain 
responders might have fewer processing constraints from a 1
st
 person to 3
rd
 person 
perspective relative to non pain responders.  
 5.1.2 Embodiment and Spatial Perspective Taking 
 
Misattributions of self with other are typically avoided because we occupy an 
egocentric point of reference with regard to our self, and, an allocentric perspective with 
regard to others. The obvious difference between an egocentric reference point and an 
allocentric reference point is a sense of embodiment (Vignemont, 2007). Embodiment 
refers to ―the sense of being localised in one‘s own body‖ (Arzy, Thut, Mohr, Mickel et al., 
2006) and is fundamental to a sense of self.  Embodiment is crucial to spatial perspective 
taking because mental rotation of the body is thought to enable switching of spatial 
perspectives (e.g. from egocentric to allocentric) (Kessler and Thomson, 2010). Blanke et 
al. (2005) used a spatial perspective taking task in which participants had to correctly 
identify the location of a glove, placed on either the manikin‘s right or left hand. Half of 
the manikins were front facing and half of the manikins were back facing. Back facing 
manikins were in spatial alignment with the participants‘ bodies; the right and left hands of 
the manikin were spatially in line with the right and left hands of the participant. In front 
facing trials, participants‘ hands and the manikins hands were situated on opposite sides. It 
took longer to correctly respond if the figure was front facing than back facing, presumably 
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because extra spatial rotation was required for the front facing figure relative to back 
facing figures. In general speed of spatial perspective taking ability tends to decrease with 
the amount of disparity between the egocentric and allocentric spatial location (Zacks and 
Micheon, 2005). Blanke et al.,(2005) described this type of spatial perspective taking as 
mental own body imagery and not perspective taking per se. Visual perspective taking 
tasks and spatial perspective taking tasks rely on different processes. Spatial perspective 
taking tasks require own body transformation. Own body mental transformation is believed 
to be self referenced, i.e. we transpose our own spatial coordinates on to another in order to 
gain information about the location of external body parts. Spatial perspective is not 
considered a mentalising task, in that it does not require the inference that other people 
have different perspectives of a visual scene. For example, children with autism have 
demonstrated impairments on level two visual perspective taking tasks as well as 
mentalising tasks but show no such impairment on spatial perspective taking compared to 
typical children (Hamilton et al., 2009).  The visual perspective taking task requires the 
observer to correctly infer another‘s perspective to correctly infer what another person sees 
i.e. take another person‘s perspective, not simply the location of another person. The 
overlap in both experience of pain demonstrated in Chapter Two  and Chapter Three 
during observation of another in pain, suggests a lack of distinction between self and other. 
It is possible that pain responders automatically map between self and other and therefore 
will show less difference in reaction times when taking on another‘s visual perspective. In 
order to test this assumption we will use a low level visual perspective taking task to 
investigate reaction times when adopting the self perspective and the perspective of others.  
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5.2 Method 
5.2.2 Participants  
 
Twenty six participants (3 male; mean: 19; range: 18-21) provided informed 
consent and took part in the experiment for course credit. Participants were divided into 
pain responders (n = 10) and non-responders (n = 16).  
5.2.3 Visual Perspective taking task  
 
5.2.3.2 Procedure 
 
Participants were invited to take part in a reaction time experiment involving an 
avatar viewed on a computer screen surrounded by three virtual walls. A female avatar was 
used for female participants and a male avatar for male participants.  At intermittent 
intervals, 0-3 circles were presented either on the wall facing the avatar or on the wall 
facing away from the avatar (figure 5.1). 
 
 
The participant could always see the number of circles. In half of the trials the 
avatar was observing the same number of dots as the participant such that the avatar‘s and 
the participant‘s perspective were consistent.  In the other half of the trials the avatar 
observed a different number of dots to the participant such that the avatar‘s and the 
participant‘s perspective were inconsistent. 
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 Prior to seeing the room, participants were cued to adopt either their own perspective, 
which was written as ―you‖, or the perspective of the avatar, which was written as ―he‖ or 
―she‖ as appropriate. After viewing the screen for 750 ms, participants were asked to 
identify the number of circles on the wall from their adopted perspective as quickly as 
possible. There were 96 trials in total. For half of these trials the participants adopted the 
perspective of the avatar and for the other half they adopted their own perspective. 
Participants identified the number of circles by pressing a button corresponding to the 
number of circles observed. Participants were asked to comfortably position their fingers 
on both the mouse buttons at the start of the trial. If participants agreed that the perspective 
they were told to adopt viewed the same amount of verified dots then participants were 
asked to press the right button mouse. If participants thought that the perspective and 
amount of dots to verify were inconsistent they were asked to press the left mouse button.  
 
Figure 5.1 Top image shows avatar observing 2 dots, this 
viewpoint is consistent with the participant’s viewpoint. 
Bottom image shows avatar observing 1 dot, the avatar’s 
perspective is inconsistent with the participant’s viewpoint.  
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Time taken to press the button was automatically recorded. Reaction times 2.5 
standard deviations outside the mean were removed as outliers.  
5.2.4 Spatial perspective taking task 
 
5.3.4.1 Procedure  
            All participants took part in the own body transformation task adapted from the 
work of Blanke et al. (2005); the stimuli used are presented in figure 5.2. Participants 
were required to complete two separate blocks consisting of 96 trials per block (24 of 
each stimuli). In the main experimental block participants were required to correctly 
respond to the location of the glove situated either on the right/left hand on the figure 
(not the screen) (see figure 5.2). Figure 5.2 depicts the front (B and D) and back (A and 
C) facing manikins used in the experiment. In the lateralisation task (baseline), 
participants were required to identify which side of the screen the glove was on.  
Participants responded using the up arrow key for left and the down arrow key for right 
hand responses. RTs were excluded if they exceeded 2.5 SDs above the mean for each 
participant. Presentation of all stimuli was counterbalanced.  
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5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Visual Perspective Taking Task   
A 2 (Perspective, Self/Other), x 2 (Consistency, Consistent/Inconsistent) x 2 (Group, 
Pain responders/Non pain responders) mixed ANOVA design was computed using the 
correct average reaction times.  
Figure 5.3 illustrates overall participants took longer to respond during consistent 
trials compared with inconsistent trials. There was a significant main effect of consistency 
(F (1, 24), = 28.8, p<0.001). 
 
Figure 5.2 The stimuli used in the main experiment adapted from Blanke et al. (2005). 
Participants are required to state which hand the glove is on. A and C are spatially 
aligned with participants, therefore no spatial transformation is necessary. B and D 
require the participant to mentally rotate their body in order to correctly identify the 
location of the glove. Underneath each figure is the correct response.  
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Participants showed no difference in reaction times between self or other 
perspectives, there was no significant main effect of perspective (F 1, 24),=0.04, p= 0.84).  
There was a significant interaction effect between consistency and perspective (F (1, 24), 
=12.6, p = 0.002).  There was a trend towards a significant interaction between 
consistency, perspective and group (F (1, 24) = 3.6, p = 0.06).  Post hoc t- tests reveal that 
there was a significant difference between inconsistent and consistent trials when verifying 
the perspective of the avatar (t (25), 7.44, p < 0.001) but not when verifying their own 
perspective (t (25), -1.6, p = 0.11).  
In order to look more closely at the pattern of results for each group a separate 2 
(Consistency, inconsistency/inconsistency) x 2 (Perspective, self/other) repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed on reaction times for both pain responders and non pain 
responders.  
 
Figure 5.3:  Participants took longer to respond during inconsistent trials (F (1, 
24), =5.3, p = 0.03). Participants were faster to verify another’s perspective during 
consistent trials relative to inconsistent trials (F (1, 24) = 49.3, p < 0.001). 
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Figure 5.4: shows that pain responders responded more quickly during consistent trials 
versus inconsistent trials. 
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Figure 5.4 shows that pain responders were significantly faster during consistent 
trials compared to inconsistent trials. There was a significant main effect of consistency (F 
(1, 9) = 31. 1, p < 0.001). There was no difference in reaction times when verifying self 
perspective versus other perspective (Perspective (F (1, 9), = 0.09, p=0.77). There was no 
significant interaction between consistency and perspective (F (1, 9) = 2.08, p = 0.18).  
Figure 5.5 shows that non pain responders were significantly faster to respond during 
consistent trials compared to inconsistent trials. There was a significant main effect of 
consistency (F (1, 15), 11.7, p < 0.004). There was no difference in reaction times when 
adopting self or other perspectives (Perspective, F (1, 15), .26, p < 0.63). There was a 
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Figure 5.5: Reaction times for non pain responders were faster during consistent trials 
versus inconsistent trials.  
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significant interaction between consistency and perspective (F (1, 15), 15.1, p < 0.001). 
Post hoc paired t tests revealed that the effect of consistency was significant when non 
responders had to verify the avatars perspective (t (15) = 5.4, p < 0.001) but not when they 
had to verify their own perspective (t (15) = -0.41, p = 0.69) (see fig 5.5).  
 
5.4. Discussion  
Here we demonstrate that pain responder‘s show reduced difference in reaction 
times when adopting their own perspective compared to the avatars. In contrast, non pain 
responders show marked differences in reaction times when adopting either self or other 
perspectives. Both pain responders and non pain responders showed the same pattern of 
responding during the spatial perspective taking tasks. This finding implies that pain 
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responders are less able to distinguish between self and others‘ visual perspective in 
comparison to non responders (Decety and Chaminade, 2003). There are two alternate 
strategies that may be taking place: either we feel what it is like for someone else to be in 
pain (like them) or we feel what it is like for us to be in pain (like us) (Decety and 
Sommerville, 2003; Galinsky, Ku and Wang, 2005). While the former would depend less 
on self representations of pain and more on ‗other‘ oriented empathic processes, the latter 
would depend more on ‗self‘ oriented representations of pain and may plausibly be less 
dependent on ‗other‘ oriented processes. It is also possible that pain responders are not 
faster to adopt another‘s perspective, but instead they do not inhibit their own perspective 
when viewing somebody else.  
The visual perspective taking task used here required the participants to make 
inferences about what another can or cannot see (Newcomb, 1989). Correctly inferring 
what another can see requires the viewer to inhibit their egocentric viewpoint and adopt the 
other‘s visual perspective. This inhibition of egocentric or self viewpoint can also 
contribute to understanding the thoughts and feelings of others by reducing the influence of 
the predominant, egocentric, self perspective (Vogeley, Bussfeld, Herrman, Happe, Falkai 
et al., 2001). Inhibiting the self perspective and adopting another‘s mental perspective is 
considered an essential part of empathic understanding (Davis, 1980). Imagining a ‗self‘ 
perspective while viewing someone in pain, for example, may aid confusion between self 
and other perspectives (Batson, Lamm and Decety, 2007).   
Visual perspective taking does not necessarily require any inference regarding the 
mental state of the other (Aichorn et al., 2006; Newcomb, 1989). Inferring the mental state 
of another and then sharing that state, as is the case with empathy, may involve 
subjectively adopting the cognitive perspective of the other to understand what he or she is 
thinking. There is a distinction between the ability to shift visual perspective, which is a 
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low level skill, and the ability to empathise by thinking what someone else is thinking or 
feeling what someone else is feeling. Presumably lower level skills, including automatic 
visual perspective taking, contribute to higher level skills, including empathy (Samson et 
al., 2006). It is possible that the low level mechanism of visual perspective taking 
contributes to the emotional experience of empathy for another in pain, which correlates 
with vicarious sensation of both touch and pain (Bannissey and Ward, 2007; Singer et al., 
2004), but that at least some components of empathy remain independent of vicarious 
sensation.  
There were no differences in the spatial perspective taking task, presumably 
because pain responders compared with non pain responders are better at tasks that require 
mentalising abilities, but not at tasks that require, for instance, mental rotation of body 
parts per se. In particular, the spatial perspective taking task is a self referenced task  
In our previous study (Chapter Two: Experiments 2.1 and 2.2) we demonstrated 
that pain responders have a high state empathy relative to non-responders. We would 
suggest that pain responders are generally faster to correctly respond when adopting the 
visual perspective of the avatar because they are better at disengaging self visual 
perspective and adopting the other‘s visual perspective. This disengagement may be more 
automatic in the pain responders, rapidly reducing the distinction between self and other, 
and providing a mechanism whereby the pain responders more readily experience pain 
when observing another in pain. Reducing the distinction between self and other could 
facilitate the mapping or simulation of bodily representations between self and other. The 
idea that adopting another perspective is more automatic in some individuals may have 
bearing on the human mirror system located in the frontal cortex. It is thought that the 
human mirror system is activated during a first person relative to a third person perspective 
(Rizzolatti, Fogassi and Gallese, 2001).  The faster processing between the perspectives 
CHAPTER FIVE: VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN PAIN RESPONDERS 
110 
 
may underpin the temporary confusion between self and other, which may be underpinned 
by mirror neurons, which do not distinguish between movements made by the self or other 
(Tversky and Hard, 2009). We are thus able to represent someone else‘s actions ―as if they 
were our own‖ (Ayer, 1963) by the sharing of representations common to action and 
perception. 
Future work will concentrate on performance on higher level mentalising such as 
inferring the thoughts, feelings and beliefs of others, which are important for the 
development of empathy (Gallese and Goldman, 1998).  Given that pain responders show 
an automatic propensity towards a blurred self and other distinction, this may have 
implications for our sense of body ownership. In the next chapter we will use the rubber 
hand illusion to investigate the sense of body ownership as a potential technique to 
understand how sensations are mislocated or referred from the observed to the observer. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ASYNCHRONOUS STROKING DOES NOT DIMINISH SENSE OF 
OWNERSHIP DURING RUBBER HAND ILLUSION    
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two we demonstrated that around one third of normal controls will 
report pain when they are exposed to images of other people in pain. In the previous 
Chapter we demonstrated that pain responders are able to readily adopt another‘s visual 
perspective. Here we investigate the extent to which ownership can be felt over another 
person‘s body part. Body ownership refers to the sense of bodily boundary – the sense that 
my body parts are mine and somebody else‘s are not (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2005). Bodily 
ownership is delivered by proprioception and feeling movement from our own body parts, 
which underpins the sense of ourselves as ourselves and as independent of others.   
Physical sensations can only be experienced though our own bodies but, as we have 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, it is possible to misattribute the sensation of pain simply 
from visual cues. Capelari, Uribe and Brasil-Neto (2009) used painful-tactile stimuli 
instead of touch in the rubber hand illusion. They demonstrated that painful visual 
information was experienced not from the participant‘s actual hand, but from the rubber 
hand. The extent to which the purely visual information contributes to the feeling of pain is  
large; however, visual information about a painful stimulus is likely to be vital for 
promoting future survival and seems to override an actual painful threat to the participant‘s 
actual body part. We do not usually have this sense of ownership and feeling of pain 
sensations over bodies that are clearly separate to our own.  In the case of pain evoked by 
someone else‘s injury, however, the boundary between the self and other is unclear. Pain 
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evoked by someone else‘s injury presumably involves a misattribution of pain sensation 
from the location of the observed injury to the same location on the observer. 
6.1.1 Rubber Hand Illusion 
 
A way of exploring body ownership is to utilize the rubber hand illusion (RHI). 
The rubber hand illusion is a common illusory experience in which a subject feels a sense 
of ownership over a rubber hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). The illusion occurs when 
the subject‘s real hand, which is hidden out of view, is stroked in synchrony with a rubber 
hand placed in full view of the subject.  Subjects will usually report feeling the stroking as 
coming from the rubber hand rather than their own, hidden, hand. This sensation is also 
typically accompanied by the sense of their hand drifting towards the position of the rubber 
hand, called proprioceptive drift.  The illusion of ownership is thought to come about 
through a combination of multisensory integration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive 
information (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2005). The extent to which either visual, tactile or 
proprioceptive information contributes to a sense of body ownership is unknown, however 
two main conditions are necessary for successful induction of the rubber hand.  
6.1.2 Predefined body map 
 
The strength 
of the illusion is 
typically attenuated 
when the size and 
appearance of the 
rubber hand do not 
accurately represent 
 Figure 6.1: The appearance of the wooden blocks, ranging from 
1-4 with 4 as most similar in appearance to a human hand, and 5, 
a prosthetic hand.  
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the subject‘s real hand (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2005; Tsakiris, Carpenter, James and 
Fotopoulou, 2010). Tsakiris et al. (2010) induced the rubber hand, using five different 
stimuli ranging from a block of wood to a prosthetic hand (see fig 6.1). Participants only 
reported a sense of ownership over stimulus five, the stimulus most representing the 
appearance of a real hand.  Presumably the absence of ownership over a non corporeal 
object suggests that body ownership is influenced by predefined anatomical information. 
Limited evidence, suggesting that predefined anatomical information is not always 
necessary for body ownership, has been reported (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003). Armel 
and Ramachandran (2003) investigated whether any object, in this case a table, could be 
integrated as part of the body schema. After simultaneous synchronous stroking of the 
participant‘s hidden real hand and a table positioned in front of the participant, participants 
reported feeling touch sensation from the area of the table that was being stroked. Skin 
conductance responses increased during synchronous stroking of the table compared to 
asynchronous stroking of the table. The finding of the study by Armel and Ramachandran 
(2003) supports the view that any object can be incorporated as part of the body, providing 
that the relationship between the visuo-tactile correlations are strong enough.   
6.1.3. Intermodal matching between vision and touch  
 
The illusion is strongest when real and rubber hands are stroked in synchrony; this 
is because visual-tactile correlations are stronger during synchronous stroking. When 
hands are stroked in an asynchronous fashion, the illusion is broken or attenuated (Armel 
and Ramachandran, 2003; Botivinick and Cohen, 1998; Constantini and Haggard, 2007; 
Tsakairis and Haggard, 2005). Presumably when the tactile information and visual input 
are out of phase, the rubber hand illusion disappears.  
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6.1.4 Individual Differences during the RHI 
 
Individuals with schizophrenia report a stronger sense of the RHI in comparison to 
healthy controls (Peled, Ritsner, Hircshman, Geva and Modai, 2000). The exact 
mechanism underpinning a stronger sense of the RHI in schizophrenics is unclear, as 
schizophrenia is a complicated psychological disorder. Moreover, even in the absence of 
the rubber hand illusion procedure, schizophrenia is partly characterised by somatic 
delusions, including the disruption of body ownership and agency (McGilchrist and 
Cutting, 1995). Body image influence is body perception. Mussap and Salton (2006) 
suggested that participants who were identified as having an unhealthy body image were 
more susceptible to experiencing the illusion.  
6.1.5 RHI and movement 
 
Although the original rubber hand illusion includes only tactile stimulation, there 
have been many different versions including movement (Drummer, Picot-Annand, Neal 
and Moore, 2009; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). In the motor version of the RHI, 
movement takes the place of the tactile brush stimulation, usually involving two 
participants performing a synchronous finger movement. The two participants might, for 
example, tap their index fingers in time with a metronome. Using movement instead of 
tactile stimulation introduces the concept of agency. The sense of agency comes from the 
efferent motor instruction (Tsakaris et al., 2007). Prior to a movement being produced, an 
intention to generate the movement must be given. The subjective feelings that are 
associated with the intention and actual movement are referred to as agency. Synchronous 
active movement of a participant‘s hand and a rubber hand produced a robust illusion of 
ownership over the rubber hand (Drummer et al., 2009; Tsakaris, Phrabu and Haggard, 
2006).  Asynchronous active movement tended to attenuate the strength of the illusion, 
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similar to asynchronous stroking (Drummer et al., 2009; Tsakaris, Phrabu and Haggard, 
2006).  
The incongruence 
between the 
produced 
movement and the 
seen movement  
has been found to 
cause somatic 
sensations, 
including pain in 
some subjects. 
McCabe et al. 
(2005) placed a 
mirror board 
occluding the participant‘s right arm. Participants were then asked to move both hands 
(either side of the mirror board) and to watch the reflection of movement produced by the 
limb in the mirror. They were then asked to move their hidden arm up and down 
asynchronously to the hand in view.  
McCabe et al. (2005) reported that the effect of moving the hand out of synchrony caused 
painful sensations (e.g. pins and needles and tingling) in around 15% of the healthy 
sample. McCabe et al. interpret the origin of this pain to be a mismatch between visual 
feedback and motor commands. This is because the participant is observing a movement in 
the mirror that is different to the movement being made by the occluded (actual) hand. The 
exact mechanism, however, for the generation of pain without injury is unclear. Individuals 
 
Figure 6.2 A feed forward model of motor commands. A motor 
(efferent) command produces an efferent copy which contains 
predictions about the outcome of movement. The predicted sensory 
outcome is then compared (using visual feedback) with the actual 
sensory feedback. When the predicted outcome and the actual 
outcome are matched then there are no sensory disturbances. When 
predicted and actual outcomes are mismatched then there is an 
increase sensory disturbance resulting in transient somatic 
sensations such as pain, discomfort, temperature changes and 
weight changes.  
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who report pain in response to images may be similar to those who report pain during a 
mismatch of efferent and afferent signals. Pain responders feel pain in the same location 
where they observe pain this suggests that pain responders may be feeling a sense of 
ownership over an external body (injured) body part. If pain responders are more likely to 
adopt an external body part as their own then we would expect pain responders to report a 
stronger sense of the rubber hand illusion.  In the second part of the experiment we tested 
whether pain responders were more likely to sensitive to sensory disturbances in general. It 
is possible that pain responders are very sensitive to internal sensations and that reporting 
pain during observation of others in pain, is more of a generic phenomenon. Here, we test 
here if they are more likely to report pain during a mismatch of sensory information. We 
test both these hypotheses using the rubber hand illusion.  
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
 
52 (mean age 20, SD 1.9) healthy females from the university of Birmingham took 
part in the study in exchange for course credit. Participants were categorised into three 
groups based on their response while observing others in pain in Experiment 2.2. This 
yielded a group of participants who reported pain to at least one painful image (pain 
responders, n = 19). The remaining participants were divided into those who responded to 
the images with a level of emotion similar to the pain responders (n=13) and those who 
responded with lower emotion (n = 20) (see 2.3.3 for results).  
6.2.2 Procedure 
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Participants were studied in pairs. Participants were studied in pairs. Participant one (P1) 
sat at a table and placed her right hand into a covered box that blocked the view of her 
hand.  Her left hand was placed in full view in a comfortable position on top of the table. 
 
Participant two (P2) was then asked to place her hand on the table in front of P1 in 
a position that P1‘s hidden hand could comfortably occupy. To do this P2 crouched or sat 
by P1 but remained largely out of 
view (see figure 6.3). Both 
participants were asked to wear 
rubber gloves on both hands and 
matching black tops so as to keep 
the appearance of the hands and 
arms as similar as possible. The 
same setup was used for each 
experimental condition. 
In the experiment there 
were four experimental 
conditions; synchronous stroking (SS), asynchronous stroking (SA), synchronous 
movement (MS), and asynchronous movement (MA). In condition SS two small 
paintbrushes were used to synchronously stroke the index fingers of P1‘s hidden hand and 
P2‘s hand on the table. P1 was instructed to concentrate on the stroking of P2‘s hand. This 
condition continued for two minutes.  
In the asynchronous stroking (SA) condition, synchronous stroking was employed for 60 
seconds to evoke the rubber hand illusion. In this particular study we used the 
 
Figure 6.3 The experimental setup. P1 sat in chair 
with right hand occluded by the screen. P2’s hand 
was positioned in place of P1’s right hand. P1 was 
instructed to fixate on P2’s hand during all 
conditions. 
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asynchronous stroking as an attempt to attenuate the sense of the illusion. The synchronous 
stroking is necessary to establish the RHI prior to disturbing the illusion (with 
asynchronous stroking). Possible consequences of attenuating the illusion are sensory 
disturbances such as pain, discomfort or peculiarity (McCabe et al., 2005). We investigated 
this possibility in this study.  
The stroking was then switched to asynchronous i.e. tactile stimulation on the 
hidden hand followed by tactile stimulation on the other person‘s hand with an interval of 
no more than 500ms. This asynchronous stimulation lasted for a further two minutes. 
In the synchronous movement/tapping (MS) condition, P1 was instructed to move 
her hidden index finger in synchrony with a metronome. P2 was instructed to move her 
index finger on the table in the same way. The metronome was set to a speed of 66Hz. To 
maintain the synchrony of movement, P1 automatically imitated the movement of P2. 
Participants were instructed to keep moving their index fingers in synchrony until 
instructed to stop. The movement lasted for two minutes.  
In the asynchronous movement/tapping (MA) condition, participants were 
instructed to begin by moving both of their fingers in synchrony to a metronome as per the 
procedure for synchronous movement. It was explained before the procedure began that P2 
should switch to tapping on the off beat when an instruction to change was given but P1 
should continue to tap on the on beat. The instruction to change was delivered after 60 
seconds of performing synchronous movements. After P2 changed her finger movement to 
the offbeat, P1 continued to tap on the on beat and concentrated on the movement of P2‘s 
finger. This asynchronous movement condition continued for a further two minutes. 
 Participants completed each experimental condition once in a counterbalanced 
order. The entire procedure lasted for one hour.   
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Botvinick and Cohen questionnaire: Indicate your response to the following questions by circling the 
appropriate number ranging from “agree strongly” (+3) to “disagree strongly” (-3) 
 
Stroking: It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the 
other person’s hand touched. 
MOVEMENT (Tapping): It seemed as if I were feeling the tap of my finger in the location where I saw 
the other person’s finger tapping. 
Disagree 
strongly 
     Agree 
strongly 
              
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Stroking: It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the other 
person’s hand. 
MOVEMENT (Tapping): It seemed as though my tapping was causing the other person’s finger to tap. 
Disagree 
strongly 
     Agree 
strongly 
              
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Stroking and MOVEMENT (Tapping): I felt as if the other person’s hand were my hand. 
 
Disagree 
strongly 
     Agree 
strongly 
              
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Figure 6.4: Three items of the Botvinick and Cohen (1998) questionnaire used to 
assess the degree of ownership of another hand. Participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement. The items were 
adapted for use with the motor or tapping version of the rubber hand experiment.  
6.2.3.1 Botvinick and Cohen Questionnaire  
 
Immediately after finishing each condition P1 was asked to fill out the Botvinick 
and Cohen (1998) questionnaire and the McCabe questionnaire. The Botvinick and Cohen 
(1998) questionnaire includes eight items describing perceptual qualities, three of which 
are highly correlated with the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) (see table 
6.1 and appendices six and seven).                    
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   6.2.3.2 McCabe Questionnaire 
The McCabe questionnaire includes nine items used to assess somatic changes 
during incongruent visuo-motor feedback (McCabe et al., 2003; McCabe et al., 2005; 
McCabe et al., 2007). The nine items refer to somatic bodily experiences such as 
painfulness, discomfort and temperature and weight changes. Participants were asked to 
what extent they agreed or disagreed with each statement from 3 to -3 respectively.  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1. Experimental Design  
 
A 2 (synchrony, asynchronous/synchronous) x 3 (group, pain responders/non pain 
responder/emotional responders), mixed ANOVA with was performed using mean ratings 
for ownership and location of sensation as separate dependent variables. The first analysis 
(6.3.3) will present data in relation to the dependent variable ―location of sensation‖ (i.e. 
the degree to which participants agreed to this statement ―it seemed as if I were feeling the 
touch of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the other person‘s hand touched‖). The 
second analysis will use the dependent variable of ―ownership‖ (i.e. the degree to which 
participants agreed to this statement ―I felt as if the other person‘s hand were my hand‖). 
6.3.3 Location of Sensation during stroking conditions 
 
Figure 6.5a shows that pain responders recorded similar ratings for feeling the 
sensation of touch on the rubber hand during synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 
There was a significant main effect of condition (F (2, 49), 25.5, p<0.001).  The illusion of 
touch sensation located at the other persons hand was diminished in both control groups in 
asynchronous stroking relative to synchronous stroking. Pain responders perceived very 
similar levels of touch from the rubber hand in synchronous and asynchronous stroking. 
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There was a significant interaction effect between group and synchrony (F (2, 49), = 3.2, 
p=0.05). Post hoc paired t-tests reveal that there was a significantly lower mean rating for 
non responders during asynchronous stroking relative to synchronous stroking (t (20), = 
3.8, p < 0.001). There were also significantly lower ratings during asynchronous stroking 
relative to synchronous stroking in emotional responders (t (14), = 3.2, p=0.01).  There 
were no significant differences between mean ratings for pain responders during 
synchronous or asynchronous stroking (t (19), = 1.1, p = .30) (see fig 6.5a).  
6.3.4. Ownership during stroking conditions 
 
Figure 6.5b illustrates that the sense of ownership was not diminished during 
asynchronous stroking for pain responders. There was no significant main effect for 
synchrony (F 1, 37), =1.5, p = 0.7). The absence of ownership or very low scores of 
ownership during the synchronous stroking for the emotional responders condition makes 
any interpretation of ownership during asynchronous stroking very problematic. There was 
also no significant interaction effect between group and synchrony (F (2, 49), 0.9, p = 0.41) 
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Figure 6.5: A) The group mean ratings for the extent to which participants feel 
touch sensations at the location of the other participant’s hand during 
synchronous and asynchronous stroking. B) The group mean ratings for 
feelings of ownership over the other participant’s hand during syncronous and 
asyncronous stroking. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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6.3.5 Location during tapping  
 
Figure 6.7a illustrates that mean ratings for location (i.e. it felt like the tapping was 
coming from the hand that was being observed) were similar during synchronous and 
asynchronous tapping for each group and that the main effect of synchrony was not 
significant (F (1, 49), 0.01, p = 0.96). The interaction between group and synchrony was 
also not significant (F (2, 49), .24, p = 0.78).  
6.3.6 Ownership during tapping  
 
Figure 6.7b illustrates that pain responders report more ownership over the rubber 
hand during asynchronous tapping than synchronous tapping. Both control groups report 
very similar levels of ownership in during synchronous and asynchronous tapping. There 
was no main effect of synchrony (F (1, 49), 0.90, p = 0.34) and no main interaction effect 
between group and synchrony (F (1, 49), 0.21, p = 0.80).  
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A 
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Figure 6.7: A) The group mean ratings for the extent to which participants feel 
touch sensations at the location of the other participant’s hand during synchronous 
and asynchronous tapping. B) The group mean ratings for feelings of ownership 
over the other participant’s hand during syncronous and asyncronous tapping. 
Error bars represent standard errors.  
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6.3.7 Somatic changes during stroking conditions 
 
Pearson‘s χ2 test of independence was performed to investigate the relationship 
between frequency somatic changes for group with each condition (synchronous stroking, 
asynchronous stroking, synchronous movement, asynchronous movement) as a separate 
variable.  
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Table 6.1 illustrates the frequency of participants who reported a somatic change 
(e.g. weight changes, sensations of heat or coldness, feeling an extra hand or losing a hand) 
as a function of group during each condition (synchronous stroking, asynchronous 
stroking, synchronous movement, asynchronous movement). The frequency of participants 
per group to report somatic changes was not significantly different during synchronous 
stroking (χ2 (2, N=53) = 2.2, p = 0.34), synchronous tapping (χ2 (2, N=53) = 2.2, p = 0.32) 
and asynchronous tapping (χ2 (2, N=53) = 1.1, p = 0.56). The percentage of participants who 
reported somatic symptoms was higher in non pain responders compared with emotional 
responders and pain responders during asynchronous stroking. There was a significant 
relationship between somatic reports and group (χ2 (2, N=53) = 6.2, p = 0.03) (see table 6.1).  
6.3.8 Somatic changes during synchronous and asynchronous stroking 
 
The McNemar repeated measures statistic was performed to investigate the 
relationship between frequency somatic changes for group with each condition 
(synchronous stroking, asynchronous stroking, synchronous movement, asynchronous 
movement) as a separate variable.  
The frequency of pain responders to report somatic symptoms did not differ during 
synchronous/asynchronous stroking (χ2 (2, N=19) = 0.0, p = 1.0). The percentage of 
emotional responders and non pain responders who reported somatic sensations increased 
during asynchronous stroking compared with synchronous stroking. The relationship 
between synchrony was significant for emotional responders (χ2 (2, N=14) = 4.6, p = 0.03) 
and for non responders (χ2 (2, N=21) = 5.1, p = 0.02). 
6.3.9 Somatic changes during synchronous and asynchronous tapping 
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The McNemar matched pairs statistic was carried out on frequency of participants 
per group who reported somatic symptoms during synchronous or asynchronous tapping. 
The percentage of pain responders who reported somatic changes did not differ during 
synchronous and asynchronous tapping (χ2 (2, N=19) = 0.91, p = 0.31). There was also no 
relationship between frequency of participants who reported somatic symptoms during 
synchronous and asynchronous tapping conditions in the emotional responders group (χ2 
(2, N=14) = 0.20, p = 0.66) or non responders group (χ2 (2, N=21) = 1.5, p= 0.21) (see table 
6.1 for percentage of participants who reported somatic changes and break down of 
prevalence of somatic symptoms).  
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Pain Responders 
  
Frequency of reports (% 
participants who reported 
symptoms) 
 
                                                  
 
SS 
 
 
12 (63) 
 
SA 
 
 
12 (63) 
 
MS 
 
 
10 (52) 
 
MA 
 
 
13 (68) 
 
 
Pain 
 
1 (5)  
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
Discomfort 5 (26) 5 (26) 2 (10) 4 (21) 
Lost Hand 4 (21) 3 (15) 5 (26) 2 (10) 
Hotter 5 (26) 2 (10) 1 (5) 2 (10) 
Colder 3 (15) 0 (0) 1 (5) 1 (5) 
Heavier 6 (31) 8 (42) 6 (31) 8 (42) 
Lighter 4 (21) 2 (10) 3 (15) 0 (0) 
Extra 7 (36) 6 (31) 6 (31) 8 (42) 
Peculiar 12 (63) 14 (73) 12 (63) 14 (73) 
     
Emotional 
Responders 
Frequency of reports (% 
participants who reported 
symptoms) 
 
 
 
SS 
 
10 (71) 
 
 
SA 
14(100) 
 
 
MS 
 
10 (71) 
 
 
MA 
 
11 (79) 
 
 
Pain 
 
1 (7) 
 
1 (7) 
 
1(7) 
 
0 (0) 
Discomfort 1 (7) 4 (29) 1 (7) 2 (14) 
Lost Hand 5 (36) 1 (7) 2 (14) 1 (7) 
Hotter 3 (21) 1 (7) 4 (29) 3 (21) 
Colder 0 (0) 1 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Heavier 3 (21) 4 (29) 4 (29) 6 (43) 
Lighter 3 (21) 2 (14) 3 (21) 1 (7) 
Extra 5 (36) 7 (50) 6 (43) 4 (29) 
Peculiar 13 (92) 14(100) 12(86) 12(86) 
     
Non Pain 
Responders 
Frequency of reports (%  
participants who reported 
symptoms)  
 
 
SS 
 
10 (48) 
 
 
SA 
 
17 (80) 
 
 
MS 
 
9 (43) 
 
 
MA 
 
13 (61) 
 
Pain 
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
Discomfort 1 (4.7)  5 (24) 1 (4.7) 2 (9.5) 
Lost Hand 0(0) 4 (19) 2 (9.5) 4 (19) 
Hotter 3 (14) 2 (9.5) 2 (9.5) 1 (4.7) 
Colder 0(0) 1 (4.7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Heavier 6 (29) 3 (14) 2 (9.5) 5 (24) 
Lighter 1 (4)  4 (19) 0 (0) 1 (4.7) 
Extra 7 (33) 9 (47) 3 (14) 9 (47) 
Peculiar 18 (86) 17 (81) 9 (42) 10 (47) 
Table 6.1: Frequency of each somatic sensations in all 4 
conditions presented by group (SS: synchronous stroking, SA: 
asynchronous stroking, MS: synchronous movement/tapping, 
MA: asynchronous movement/tapping). 
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6.4 Discussion 
Here we present two unique findings. Firstly, the illusion of ownership over another 
person‘s hand is not attenuated during asynchronous stroking conditions in pain 
responders. Our second finding demonstrates for the first time that asynchronous stroking 
generates somatic disturbances because of visuo-tactile conflict. 
6.4.1 Asynchronous stroking does not diminish rubber hand illusion 
 
Pain responders reported similar experiences of the illusion in the asynchronous stroking as 
the synchronous stroking condition. This finding is not in line with previous research 
demonstrating that the rubber hand illusion is significantly attenuated during asynchronous 
stroking (Aspell, Lenggenhager and Blanke, 2009; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, 
Passington and Holmes, 2005; Moseley, Olthof, Venema, Don, Wijers, et al., 2008; Makin, 
Holmes and Ehrsson, 2008; Tsakaris et al., 2006; Tsakaris and Haggard, 2005); Tsakaris et 
al. (2006) used the distance between the perceived hand position before and after the 
induction procedure (‗proprioceptive drift‘), in contrast to the Botvinick and Cohen 
questionnaire scores. Items from the Botvinick and Cohen questionnaire have also 
demonstrated an attenuated sense of the illusion during asynchronous stroking, indicating 
that both objective and subjective measures equally reflect the strength of the illusion 
(Aspell, et al., 2009).  Synchronous stroking is considered as a necessary requirement for 
ownership over an external body part (Tsakiris, 2010; Makin, Holmes and Ehrsson, 2008). 
Here, reports of body ownership during asynchronous stroking suggest that strong 
correlations between tactile and visual input are less important for ownership over another 
person‘s hand, in a minority of healthy participants. It is possible that visual, not tactile, 
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information drives feelings of ownership in the rubber hand illusion in a minority of 
participants. Visual information about pain in others generates reports of pain in the 
observer. Here, we provide some preliminary evidence suggesting that ownership over 
another person‘s hand is sometimes not dependent on strong visuo-tactile correlations 
(Tsakiris, 2010), also suggesting that visual information may, in some cases, be a more 
dominant factor in body ownership during this modified rubber hand illusion. In a recent 
imaging study Tsakiris, Longo and Haggard, (2010) have demonstrated that the insula 
plays a role in body ownership. In addition, in Chapter three we demonstrated that the 
insula is associated with pain generated by observation of others in pain. The insula may 
play role in both the generation of pain by observation of pain on an external body part.  
 
An alternative explanation for the effects observed during the asynchronous 
condition may be the strength of the illusion during the initial synchronous induction 
period. In each trial synchronous stroking was used to generate a sense of body ownership 
prior to the introduction of the asynchronous stroking. It is possible that pain responders 
felt a very strong sense of the illusion, which was prolonged during asynchronous stroking. 
It is possible that reports of sensation of touch and ownership are more representative of 
the strength or carry over effects of synchronous stroking condition, as opposed to specific 
effects of the asynchronous stroking.  It is however, unlikely that the strength of the 
illusion during synchronous stroking alone could account for the strength of the illusion 
during asynchronous stroking. The total scores for the two main aspects revealed no 
difference between pain responders and controls on the reported perceptual effects for the 
synchronous stroking condition. This is in line with the results of previous studies 
demonstrating the robustness of the illusion thought to occur in around 80% of samples 
(Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998, Tsakaris and Haggard, 
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2005).  Despite the strength of the illusion in both control groups, the mean rating for 
sensation of touch and ownership was significantly reduced during asynchronous stroking. 
During synchronous stroking, pain responders and non responders both reported a 
feeling of ownership and a sense of sensation at the location of the other person‘s hand, 
suggesting that these two groups of participants experienced a coherent sense of ownership 
over the other person‘s hand.  Emotional controls reported significantly less sense of  
ownership than pain responders and non pain responders during synchronous stroking.    
Despite not reporting a sense of ownership over the other person‘s hand, emotional 
responders reported feeling the sensation of touch from the other person‘s hand.  It is 
unclear how a proportion of participants feel a sensation of touch and ownership of the 
limb are dissociated in this way.   
Mislocalisation of touch from actual body locations to other locations in 
peripersonal space using distracter lights has been reported (Pavani, Spence and Driver, 
2001). Participants‘ real hands were hidden out of view while holding foam cubes in their 
hand. Placed in front of them was a fake hand which also appeared to be holding foam 
cubes; attached to the foam cubes were distracter lights. Participants‘ thumb or index 
fingers were stimulated with tactile vibrators and participants were required to state the 
location of the tactile sensation. Distracter lights were activated simultaneously with the 
tactile vibration, sometimes at the location of the participant‘s hand and sometimes at the 
location of the rubber hand. When distracter lights were observed at the location of the 
rubber hand, touch was mislocated to the rubber hand.  
A similar type of sensory mislocalisation has been observed with auditory stimuli 
in the ventriloquism effect (Bertelson,Vroomen, De Gelder, and Driver, 2000). The 
ventriloquism effect occurs when sound is mislocated because of bias visual cues away 
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from the source of the sound. It may be likened to the mislocalisation of touch away from 
the true source of the touch in this rubber hand illusion, and can be present despite the 
absence of ownership. The visual cue of the brush may become more dominant than the 
touch of the hand. Armel and Ramachandran (2003) report that it is possible to use the 
rubber hand illusion to evoke a sense of ownership over a table; alternatively, this could be 
explained in terms of the mislocatisation of touch rather than ownership over the table per 
se. Austin, Soto-Faraco, Enns and Kingstone (2004) performed a similar study to examine 
whether the fake body part was incorporated as part of the body schema. They 
demonstrated that the mislocalisation of touch disappeared when the fake hand was placed 
in a position incompatible with the participant‘s real hand. Austin et al. (2004) concluded 
that the rubber hand had been incorporated into the participants‘ body schema and as a 
result participants felt a sense of ownership. The congruent hand posture may be necessary 
for both ownership and mislocalisation of touch, but here we demonstrate that, at least in 
some subjects, body ownership and mislocalisation of touch are dissociable.  
Pain responders report a sense of body ownership and feeling of touch sensation to 
a greater extent than controls during synchronous and asynchronous stroking. Overall the 
results indicate that pain responders are more readily able to adopt another person‘s body 
part as their own regardless of whether the incoming information is synchronous or not. 
This suggests that the tactile/proprioceptive afferent information is less important for 
integration of foreign body parts in pain responders, than for those individuals who do not 
feel pain when they look at another person in pain. A more flexible sense of body part 
ownership could in part form the basis of how pain is mislocated from one body part 
location to another.  It would be interesting to modulate the amount of incoming sensory 
information required to experience ownership over another limb within this population.   
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6.4.2 Pain and sensori-motor conflict  
 
We predicted that incongruence of visual feedback and motor commands would 
produce a sensation of pain, as demonstrated by McCabe et al. (2005). Participants did not 
report any pain during the asynchronous tapping condition; this was the only condition 
with no accompanying pain reports.  Unfortunately, we only demonstrated a very weak 
sense of ownership during the synchronous tapping and therefore it was difficult to disrupt 
sensory-motor congruence. Participants were required to tap in sync with each other 
following the beat of a metronome. While most participants found synchronous tapping 
initially quite straightforward, it was difficult to maintain complete synchrony during the 
two minute trial. McCabe et al. (2005) used mirrors to provide feedback to the participants. 
In comparison, we required that both participants maintained accurate timing when tapping 
their fingers to a metronome. It is possible that the tapping movements produced by two 
participants may not have been provided completely synchronous feedback in the same 
way that a mirror can. Without perfect synchrony of tapping, match between incoming 
sensory information and motor commands may not have been achieved. In the absence of a 
match, the change or contrast to a mismatch is attenuated and no somatic changes were 
experienced.  Pain responders did score highest on items that represent body ownership 
and feeling of sensation which would suggest a degree of match and/or mismatch between 
visual information and motor commands. Despite these scores, the change between 
synchronous and asynchronous movement conditions failed to yield reports of pain. We 
are already using more sophisticated methods including projecting a tapping hand using 
video equipment to induce a stronger sense of the illusion during tapping or motor versions 
of the rubber hand. 
6.4.3 Somatic reports during sensori-motor conflict 
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In general, the number of somatic reports increased during asynchronous tapping, 
suggesting that although pain did not occur that there was some sensory disturbance 
induced by the during sensori-motor conflict. This is in line with evidence from McCabe et 
al. (2005) suggesting that when visual information does not match the intended motor 
command and resulting action, sensory disturbances are generated.  
6.4.4 Somatic symptoms during stroking conditions  
 
 Here we demonstrate that incongruent visuo-tactile information (asynchronous 
stroking) results in both a reduced sense of ownership and increase in somatic symptoms, 
including discomfort, temperature and weight changes in both control groups. Other 
studies have shown that visuo-tactile stimulation of a rubber hand, in a synchronous 
fashion, can result in somatic sensations. Synchronous stroking produced equal levels of 
pain experience as the asynchronous stroking condition however there was a five times 
increase in reports of discomfort during asynchronous stroking in non responders and a 
four times increase in emotional responders. Moseley et al. (2008) also demonstrated that 
homeostatic functions such as temperature regulation are modulated during the rubber 
hand illusion (Moseley et al. 2008). With ownership over a rubber hand, the temperature of 
the participant‘s real hand was significantly reduced (Moseley et al., 2008). The greater the 
strength of the rubber hand illusion, the colder the temperature of the hand.   Consistent 
with other rubber hand studies, the hand was significantly cooler during synchronous 
stroking. Other tactile illusions have also demonstrated somatic feelings such as the 
numbness illusion (Dieguez, Mercer, Newby and Blanke, 2009). The numbness illusion 
occurs when two people place their palms together and both index fingers are stroked. 
Usually, during synchronous stroking relative to asynchronous stroking of the index 
fingers, a sense of numbness occurs.  The numbness illusion does not rely on visual 
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information like the rubber hand illusion. Here we demonstrate that disruption of touch, 
vision and proprioceptive integration induced by asynchronous stroking produces an 
increase in somatic symptoms relative to synchronous stroking. When subjective feelings 
of ownership are unchanged, the frequency of somatic symptoms remains unchanged, as 
demonstrated by pain responders.  
McCabe et al. (2005) explained that sensory disturbances (i.e. pain, temperature 
changes etc) during sensori-motor conflict occur because of a mismatch between observed 
and performed action. For example, a motor (efferent) command produces an efferent copy 
which contains predictions about the outcome of movement. The predicted sensory 
outcome is then compared (using visual feedback) with the actual sensory feedback. When 
the predicted outcome and the actual outcome are matched then there are no sensory 
disturbances. When predicted and actual outcomes are mismatched then there is an 
increase sensory disturbance resulting in transient somatic sensations such as pain, 
discomfort, temperature changes and weight changes. It is possible that a similar type of 
conflict could occur between incongruent visuo-tactile information resulting in somatic 
disturbances.
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 CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the findings demonstrated in this thesis. The 
general aim of the thesis was to investigate acute pain without injury using observation of 
pain as a model for generating pain. Previous research has focused upon empathy for the 
pain of another and has demonstrated that emotional (Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 
2005) and sensory (Avenanti et al., 2005; Avenanti et al., 2006; Bufalari et al., 2007) 
components of pain  are generated when observing another in pain. Sensations of pain have 
also been generated by observing others in pain (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010).  Fitzgibbon et al. 
reported that a small minority of phantom limb patients reported pain or increased pain in 
their phantom when observing or hearing about pain in others. The concept that pain is 
generated primarily by visual input is a novel and unusual concept that remains largely 
unexplored. To date, no studies have investigated the experiential qualities resulting from 
observation of others in pain in healthy individuals or, more specifically, if they can feel 
pain when observing another in pain. Here we will re-state the aims of the thesis and give 
an overview of some of the main findings.  
7.2 Aims of the thesis 
This thesis aimed to first investigate pain generated by observation of others in pain.  In 
general, it was anticipated that pain generated by observation of pain in others is the same 
as pain generated by a noxious stimuli. In order to test this hypothesis we employed fMRI 
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to investigate whether pain sensation generated by others in pain was associated with brain 
activity occurring with pain generated by, for example, noxious heat. It was anticipated 
that pain generated by visual observation of pain could be related to the way pain in others 
is perceived, general over reporting of symptoms, memories of pain and other perceptual 
aberrations; all of these factors have been investigated. Sensation of pain that is generated 
via observation of somebody else raises the question about the extent to which we share 
the experiences of others. The distinction between self and other often underpins the ability 
to take different perspectives. We therefore investigated the ability of pain responders to 
take different visual perspectives compared to spatial perspectives to investigate whether 
pain responders would more readily be able to adopt the perspective of others. A way of 
investigating the self/ other distinction is to manipulate a sense of body ownership. Usually 
we only attribute sensations to parts of the body over which we feel ownership.  To further 
investigate how sensations can be referred we used an adapted version of the rubber hand 
illusion. We anticipated that pain responders would be more readily able to adopt another 
person‘s hand into their body schema and report an increased sense of tactile sensation at 
the location of the other person‘s hand. Pain responders may also be more likely to report 
sensory disturbances (i.e. pain, discomfort) generated by sensori-motor conflict; we 
investigated this possibility using a motor version of the rubber hand illusion.  
7.3 Neural correlates of pain generated by observation of pain in others 
Here we demonstrate for the first that a significant minority of healthy individuals 
report a sensation of pain triggered by the observation of others in pain. This is the first 
study to demonstrate that physical sensations of pain are generated by observing another in 
pain in a sample of healthy controls, which adds to the existing body of literature reporting 
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other vicarious sensations, such as touch (Bannissey and Ward, 2007; Blakemore et al., 
2005).  Pain responders did not perceive the painful images to be more painful than both 
non pain responder groups, suggesting that pain responders perceive or process painful 
visual stimuli in a similar way to the two control groups.   
          Pain sensation generated by others in pain is associated with activity in the pain 
matrix, more specifically, the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices, associated 
with the coding of location and intensity of pain sensation (Price, 2000) (see Chapter 
Three). This demonstrates that the pain reported by a significant minority of participants is 
underpinned by the same coding mechanisms involved in physical pain. Pain generated by 
observation of others in pain implies a sense of shared experience. Shared somatic 
experiences are often explained in terms of shared representations and underpinned by 
mirror neurons (Blakemore et al., 2005; Gallese, 2005; Keysars et al., 2004). It is possible 
that representations of pain are activated in the observer in response to another in pain. 
Most of the time the representations are limited to the affective component of pain; 
however, in pain responders a complete representation of pain may be activated 
automatically (i.e. physical sensations of pain). It is plausible that when we see another in 
pain, the representational content of the pain is based on first person experiences, in the 
same way that representations of emotions generated by others in an emotional state are 
based on first person experiences of emotion (Gallese, 2005; Freedberd and Gallese, 2007; 
Keysars and Gazzola, 2009; Niedenthal, 2007). Here, it is assumed that pain generated in 
the absence of injury is an automatic and implicit process (Gallese, 2001). 
           The fMRI findings are also consistent with evidence from single cell recordings in 
monkeys demonstrating that cells in the ventral intraparietal cortex (VIP) which have 
strong anatomical connections to the somatosensory cortices (SII and BA2), fire when 
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observing touch and also feeling touch (Ishida, Nakajima, Inase and Murata, 2009). The 
extent to which individual neurons fire when observing and experiencing a pain state in 
humans is however unclear. The average isotropic voxel sizes used in fMRI (e.g. 3mm) are 
large enough to include a subset of neurons that code representation of pain generated by 
others and a separate of set of neurons that code noxious input in the individual. 
Additionally, the smoothing of the data in the preprocessing stage, can blur the signal 
generated from a spatially contiguous pool of voxels (Gazzola and Keysars, 2009).  It is 
therefore possible that neurons involved in observed pain and felt pain are distinct, yet 
spatially intertwined (Morrison and Downing, 2007).  Jackson, Rainville and Decety 
(2006) demonstrated a partial overlap of observed and felt pain also consistent with 
Morrison and Downing (2007). Recently, Gazzola and Keysars (2009), used single subject 
unsmoothed data to investigate if the same voxels responded to observed and performed 
action. They demonstrated that all 16 subjects showed activation of observed and 
experienced action in the same voxel in the ventral premotor and inferior parietal cortex, 
the same location in which mirror neurons have been found in monkeys (Fogassi, Ferrari, 
Gesierich, Rozzi, Chersi et al., 2005).  When the unsmoothed data was compared to 
smoothed group level data, the areas of overlap were similar.  Evidence for shared voxels 
in pain is provided by single cell recordings in the cingulate cortex region that were active 
during observation of pain and experience of pain in a small number of patients with 
affective disorders (Hutchinson, Davies, Lozano, Tasker and Dostrovsky, 1999).  
 The theory of embodied simulation posits that first person states are accessed 
automatically at a subconscious level in order to understand third person states (Gallese, 
2005). Evidence to suggest that first person representations of pain are required to 
understand third person experiences is provided by an emerging literature on autism and 
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mirror neurons. Individuals with autism are substantially impaired in understanding self 
referential and other referential states (Lombardo, Chakrabati, Bullmore, Sadek, Pasco et 
al., 2010). Brain activity underpinning understanding of emotions (pars ocularis, insula and 
the amygdala) increased when observing emotional expressions (e.g. fear, happiness, 
sadness, etc.) in age and IQ matched controls relative to children with autism. The reduced 
activation in the areas associated with observation of emotional expressions in children 
with autism suggests that the basic coding mechanism allowing the understanding of others 
is impaired (Lombardo et al., 2010).  Presumably individuals with autism lack the 
functional neural architecture (i.e. mirror neurons) to imitate emotions of others (Dapretto, 
Davies, Pfeifer, Scott, Sigman et al., 2006) as well as the actions of others (Théoret, 
Halligan,
 
Kobayashi, Fregni, Tager-Flusberg, 2005).  The inability to represent others‘ 
actions and emotions seems to emerge from an inability to personally experience states 
including pain (Gallese, 2001). Pain generated by observation of others in pain implies a 
sense of shared experience. Shared somatic experiences are often explained in terms of 
shared representations. The extent to which one is able to take the perspective of others 
may depend on the extent that self/other representations of pain are shared.  For example, 
Avenanti et al. (2009) investigated the specific effects of state and trait empathy upon 
modulation of motor evoked potentials. They found that perceived pain intensity was 
inversely correlated with changes in motor evoked potentials. That is to say, participants 
who rated the stimuli as more intense demonstrated more motor inhibition. Equally, 
participants who were more able to take the perspective of another also had increased 
motor inhibition. It is plausible that representations of others pain are modulated according 
to how pain is personally experienced by the individual. It is likely that pain responders are 
generally quicker to bridge the gap between self and other in most situations, given their 
increased ability on visual perspective taking tasks (Chapter Five). During visual 
CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
140 
 
perspective taking participants were asked to represent both self perspective and other 
perspective. Pain responders demonstrated little differences when asked to adopt self/other 
perspectives relative to non responders.  It is possible that pain responders have a more 
flexible sense of body ownership, requiring only minimal visual-tactile integration in order 
to experience another person‘s body part as their own. This suggests that pain responders 
represent self and others as more similar than most individuals. Similarity between self and 
other has been reported by a sample of patients with Fibromyalgia (Frith, 1999; Karst et al. 
2005). It has been demonstrated that Fibromyalgia patients lacked an ability to judge 
whether touch was self generated or performed by someone else. Further research could 
investigate whether confusion between self and externally generated sensations is found in 
those who report pain after viewing others in pain.  
 
         Pain reports were associated with a similar pain memory which is consistent with 
others studies suggesting that how we process another in pain depends on previous 
experience with pain. Cheng, Lin, Lui, Hsu, Lim et al. (2007) demonstrated that medical 
practitioners with at least two years of experience of acupuncture showed less activation in 
the ACC, insula, PAG and SII, when observing images depicting needles inserted into 
hands than control participants. These results suggest that familiarity of an observed 
painful stimulus may lead to habituation of a response to observed pain in the same way 
that the response to noxious stimuli habituates after repeat exposure.  The extent to which 
one is able to take the perspective of others may depend on the extent that self/other 
representations of pain are shared.  For example, Avenanti et al. (2009) investigated the 
specific effects of state and trait empathy upon modulation of motor evoked potentials. 
They found that perceived pain intensity was inversely correlated with changes in motor 
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evoked potentials. That is to say, participants who rated the stimuli as more intense 
demonstrated more motor inhibition. Equally, participants who were more able to take the 
perspective of another also had increased motor inhibition. It is plausible that 
representations of others pain are modulated according to how pain is personally 
experienced by the individual. Given the high number of pain responders who reported 
pain and also reported a pain memory, personal pain representations are likely to influence 
experiential qualities associated with pain in others. As such, a more direct access to pain 
content produces more overlap between self and other representations of pain. For 
example, individuals who feel pain when eating cold foods like an ice lolly, presumably 
because of sensitive teeth, would be more likely than others who have not had this 
experience to share representations of pain related to eating cold foods. We are currently 
investigating this possibility.  
7.4 Visual representations of pain  
         It is unlikely that visual information is unique in the generation of pain in the absence 
of noxious stimuli. For example, semantic information is sufficient to evoke a 
representation of pain in the reader. Kelly et al. (2007) showed participants painful words 
such as ache and stinging in contrast with non pain words such as stool and decorate whilst 
undergoing fMRI. They found that areas of the brain involved in the affective components 
of pain were activated when participants read pain related words compared with non pain 
related words. Motor and pre-motor cortices were activated during the reading of words 
related to movement of body parts such as hands and feet (Hauk, Johnsrude and 
Pulvermuller, 2004). Recall of sounds activates areas of the brain underpinning processing 
of sound (Wheeler, Petersen and Buckner, 2000).  Visual information is a useful way of 
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triggering memories, thoughts and feelings; however it is also plausible that pain can be 
generated by imagination or by being told of another in pain as reported by Fitzgibbon et 
al. (2010). Here we demonstrate that the S1 and S2 are activated during sight of others in 
pain. It is well known parts of the S1 and S2 receive input from areas that code visual and 
auditory such as the ventral intraparietal area (VIP) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 
(Keysers, 2010). The presence of bi-modal neurons coding touch and observation of touch 
in monkeys indicates it is possible to generate the same phenomenal experience from both 
first and third hand visual experience (Ishida et al, 2009).  Therefore, it is plausible that the 
visual representation of pain is sufficient for an experience of pain, however, at present it is 
unknown to the extent that a pure visual painful input drives the experience of pain during 
vicarious pain experience.  
7.5 Pain in perspective  
Pain processing is no longer a system considered as a hardwired, unitary system that 
occurs as a result of tissue damage (Wall, 1999). Pain is considered as separate from a 
more general unpleasant feeling, because of its somatic component. Despite the subjective, 
sometimes capricious, nature of pain, it is still peculiar to conceptualise the idea of 
experiencing pain after observation of another in pain. We are however, much more 
familiar with idea of experiencing emotions via observation of emotion (Dapretto et al., 
2005); presumably we learn and develop these emotions through interaction with others. It 
is intuitive to experience sadness when watching another person cry; it is not intuitive to 
experience pain when we watch another person in pain.  This thesis suggests that we 
automatically and implicitly model the ‗states‘ of others, even states with somatic 
components, such as pain (Keysars and Gazzola, 2009). It is plausible that interaction with 
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others shapes the meaning and expression of pain behaviour (Derbyshire, 2006). 
Observations of others‘ emotional states, for instance, potentially develop because of 
constant embodiment of others‘ emotional states. It is possible that we experience different 
representations of pain through embodying different pain experiences in others. There is 
variance in pain experience because what pain comes to mean, and how it is ultimately 
experienced, is predominately a function of interaction with others.  The mechanism 
underlying pain generated by observation of others in pain and pain resulting from injury is 
likely to differ, however they both likely lead to activation of pain representations. Given 
the resulting pain representations from both acute pain and vicarious pain, I would 
speculate that the pain experience associated with observation of others in pain, is the same 
as pain generated by acute pain (i.e. there is no functional difference between pain caused 
by acute pain and pain generated by observation of others in pain).  
Without strong significance and aversion from pain it is unlikely that pain would still feel 
unpleasant. For example, even when the ability to locate the intensity, location and quality 
of sensation is intact, pain may bear no motivational significance unless it is strongly 
connected to affective/evaluative properties. Patients who have undergone cingulotomy, (a 
procedure which a lesion is made to areas of the brain, particularly the anterior cingulate 
cortex, to reduce intractable pain sensations) (Yen, Kung, Su, Lin, Howng et al., 2005) 
report an indifference towards their pain: for instance they have said, ―In fact it‘s still 
agonising, but I don‘t mind‖ (Brand and Yancy, 1997, p. 210). Without significance or 
aversion from, say, an intense stinging or stabbing pain, there is no significance to the pain 
experience (Brand and Yancy, 1997; Grahek, 2001). In healthy participants, affective 
components exacerbate pain intensity (Ploghaus, Narain, Beckmann, Clare, Bantick et al., 
2001) and in chronic pain patients, anxiety can maintain or prolong the problem 
(McKracken, Zayfert and Gross, 1992). It is possible that embodied stimulation of others 
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pain could also form the basis of chronic pain pain (Gallese, 2001). This thesis has 
demonstrated that pain is generated by observation of others in pain. As such, this type of 
pain is very fleeting, lasting for no more than a couple of seconds. It is very hard to 
compare this type of pain to the intractable pain experienced in functional pain.  However, 
it is possible that pain representations that are activated via a mechanism such as others in 
pain but instead of a fleeting pain experience, the pain representations could be 
permanently maintained by others mechanisms (e.g. maladaptive cognition, anxiety and/or 
depression). Weakening or strengthening the emotional experience associated with pain 
through a process of embodied simulation could weaken or strengthen the intensity of pain.  
 
The lack of ability to experience aversion from the other unpleasant experiences is 
experienced when brain areas linked to functional processing of, for instance, disgust are 
damaged. For example, lesions to the insula, the area underpinning disgust representations, 
impairs the ability to recognise disgust in others as well as firsthand experiences of disgust 
(Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun and Yound, 2000).  Individuals 
who are not able to represent the states of others possess limited ability to experience those 
states themselves (Dapretto et al., 2006; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Oberman and 
Ramachandran, 2007).  Adults diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorder also fail to 
represent pain in the same way as typical adults, demonstrated by a lack of reduction in 
cortico-spinal excitability when observing others in pain (Minio-Paluello, Baron Cohen, 
Avenanti, Walsh and Aglioti (2009). Usually in typically developed adults, cortico-spinal 
excitability reduces when observing others in pain (Avenanti et al., 2005; 2006), which is 
usually taken as a proxy of empathy for others in pain. The absence of direct resonance 
between self and other pain may change the way that pain is personally experienced.  The 
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inability to represent pain in others may underpin reduced sensitivity or indifference to 
pain, commonly reported by individuals with autism (Militerni, Bravaccio, Falco, Puglisi-
Allegra, Pascucci, et al., 2000).   
7.7 Domain specific pain observation 
We have discussed how self/other representations of pain are potentially shared by 
pain responders, especially when they have experienced a similar type of pain to pain that 
is observed. It is likely that pain responders are generally quicker to bridge the gap 
between self and other in most situations, given their increased ability on visual 
perspective taking tasks (Chapter Five). During visual perspective taking participants have 
to represent both self perspective and other perspective. Pain responders demonstrated little 
differences when asked to adopt self/other perspectives relative to non responders. The 
illusion of ownership over another person‘s hand is not attenuated during asynchronous 
stroking conditions in pain responders. Non responders demonstrate an attenuation of 
ownership during asynchronous stroking in line with numerous studies demonstrating that 
weak visuo-tactile integration diminishes the extent to which ownership is felt over another 
person‘s hand (Aspell, Lenggenhager and Blanke, 2009; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; 
Ehrsson, Passington and Holmes, 2005; Moseley, Olthof, Venema, Don, Wijers, et al., 
2008; Makin, Holmes and Ehrsson, 2008; Tsakaris et al., 2006; Haggard and Tsakiris, 
2005). It is possible that pain responders have a more flexible sense of body ownership, 
requiring only minimal visuo-tactile integration in order to experience another person‘s 
body part as their own. This suggests that pain responders represent self and others as more 
similar than most individuals. Similarity between self and other has been reported by a 
sample of patients who report auditory hallucinations and a group of Fibromyalgia patients 
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(Frith, 1999; Karst et al. 2005). For example, both patient populations lacked an ability to 
judge whether touch was self generated or performed by someone else. In Chapter Two, 
pain responders also reported higher than average numbers of anomalous experiences such 
as hallucinations. Nine out of ten responders reported they felt the presence of someone 
else despite the fact that there was no one present or detected a smell that no one else 
detected. It is possible that the high number of perceptual anomalies reported by the pain 
responders may stem also from the way that self and other are represented in pain 
responders. Given that the increased ability to adopt somebody else‘s perspective and also 
the relatively high number of perceptual experiences, both unrelated to pain, the 
mechanism underpinning pain generated by others in pain is unlikely to be pain specific. It 
is more likely that it is a general mechanism which represents the other as very similar to, 
if not the same as, the self.  It is plausible that there is a temporary, automatic, confusion 
between self and other when pain responders view another in pain.   
  
We have investigated the phenomenon of pain sensation generated by observing 
another in pain in an embodied simulation framework. Embodied simulation assumes 
representations generated by observation of others are generated at a neural level, but not 
necessarily at a phenomenological level. However, it is likely that, if there is a direct 
overlap between self and other, it allows the observer to know what it is like to be in that 
pain. Knowing what it is like to be in these types of pain is likely to evoke a feeling of 
empathy.  It is interesting that pain responders did not report significantly more empathy 
that participants who did not feel pain, which suggests that empathy is not a factor 
underpinning the experience of pain brought about by observation of others in pain.  We 
have not specifically addressed the notion of empathy, as this has not been the direct focus 
of this thesis. We have focused on the extent to which we automatically adopt another‘s 
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perspective, presumably mediated by an automatic and implicit resonance system (Gallese, 
2005; Keysars and Gazzola, 2009). It is however, plausible that empathy emerges as a 
reflexive and conscious evaluation of somebody else‘s pain, supported by the basic 
resonance afforded during embodied simulation of another‘s pain (Gallese, 2005; Gallese, 
Keysars, Rizzolatti, 2004; Keysars and Rizzolatti, 2009). 
7.8 Strengths and limitations 
Here we have demonstrated for the first time that in a significant minority of 
individuals pain is generated by observation of another in pain. We have linked this 
vicarious pain experience to areas of the brain coding the sensory discriminative aspects of 
pain, suggesting that pain generated by others in pain is similar to pain evoked by a more 
typical noxious stimulus (e.g. thermal or mechanical stimuli). A particular strength of this 
thesis is the inclusion in the fMRI study in Chapter Three of an ‗emotional condition‘. The 
ability to detract activation generated by an emotional scene from activation generated by a 
painful scene enables us to infer that the resulting activation is driven by the observation of 
pain and not by the emotional content of a painful image.  
A limitation of the thesis is that we have not directly compared the areas of activation 
during pain generated by a noxious stimulus with pain generated by observation of others 
in pain.   Participants were included as pain responders if they reported pain to at least 1/10 
images. All of the data was included in the fMRI analyses despite the fact that pain was not 
reported to all images. It would be interesting to analyse only data for the images when 
pain was reported and compare it against the images that did not evoke pain.    
This focus of this thesis has also not specifically addressed the role of empathy in the 
generation of this type of pain experience. Empathy is the emotional consequence of 
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observing others in pain, and, while it probably is necessary during the experience of pain 
generated by others in pain, it is unlikely to drive this experience. We have used a visual 
perspective taking task in Chapter Five to investigate the extent to which representations of 
self and other overlap. Future work could include higher level perspective taking 
mechanisms such as attributing mental states to others.  
7.9 Conclusions and future directions 
This thesis demonstrates for the first time that pain can be generated by observation of 
others in pain. Reports of pain are associated with the areas of the brain that underpin the 
sensory/discriminative aspects of pain processing, suggesting that reports of pain are 
underpinned by the same neural processes involved when processing a noxious stimuli. 
Pain responders are characterised by the ability to more readily take another person‘s 
perspective, adopt another person‘s body part into their body schema, experience 
anomalous perceptions other than pain, and have in general, have had more past injuries 
accompanied by pain than non responders. Observing another in pain is a valid method for 
inducing pain in the absence of noxious stimuli. Little is known about the exact time 
course of this pain experience and the transient nature of the pain. In order to look more 
closely at the time course, different imaging techniques such as magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) could be applied. Future work should also consider the inter-individual variability 
of pain experience in pain responders.
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